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ABSTRACT
This Article challenges the use of human dignity as an independ-
ent free speech justification. The articulation of free speech in hu-
man dignity terms carries unwarranted potential consequences that
may result in limiting free speech rather than protecting it. This pos-
sible outcome makes human dignity inadequate as a free speech justi-
fication.
This Article also demonstrates why articulations of the rationales
behind the argument from dignity are either superfluous, since they
are aptly covered by the argument from autonomy, or simply too
broad and speech-restrictive to be considered free speech justifica-
tions. As a matter of principle, the nexus between freedom of speech
and human dignity should be construed as inherently contentious.
This Article combines theoretical and comparative analyses to
demonstrate why European and other Western democracies are more
susceptible to the use of human dignity, both in their constitutional
doctrines and as a speech-restrictive term. Current American schol-
arship regarding dignity as a free speech justification neglects to rec-
ognize the harms of such discourse in a non-American setting, as well
as in the United States. Thus, unintentionally, advocates of free
speech may actually promote ajustification that eventually will lead to
speech restriction. For these reasons, the Article warns that inserting
human dignity into the realm of free speech justifications may be
analogous to inserting a "Trojan Horse," with human dignity as "the
enemy from within."
INTRODUCTION
In recent years, human dignity has increasingly become a prevail-
ing justification both for the protection and limitation of human
rights internationally.' At the same time, vagueness surrounds hu-
Human dignity appears as a fundamental right and a constitutive principle in prominent
international documents and treaties, as well as in an increasing number of foreign constitu-
tions. SeeJochen Abr. Frowein, Human Dignity in International Law, in THE CONCEPT OF HUMAN
[Vol. 9:4
DIGNITY-THE ENEMY FROM WITHIN
man dignity and its different possible interpretations, even in con-
text-specific legal settings. While human dignity plays a limited role
in the American legal system, its potency, influence, and even its lit-
eral meaning are far greater in other democracies.2 In those coun-
tries, human dignity often encompasses values such as equality and
serves as a platform to promote progressive liberal or communitarian
ideas. Human dignity's increasing influence leads to a growing ten-
dency to evaluate rights, including freedom of expression, through its
lens.
The relationship between freedom of speech and human dignity
is vague, ambiguous and has not been sufficiently explored to date.
Often the two conflict, and a proper balance between them is diffi-
cult to reach, as human dignity may be used as ajustification for both
protecting speech and restricting it. The goals of this analysis are first
to show the inadequacy of human dignity as an independentjustifica-
tion for free speech, and second, that human dignity and freedom of
DIGNITY IN HUMAN RIGHTS DISCOURSE 121, 121-22 (David Kretzmer & Eckart Klein eds., 2002)
(commenting on the presence of human dignity ideas in early international law theory but re-
marking on the express reference to human dignity in more recent international texts); Georg
Nolte, European and US Constitutionalism: Comparing Essential Elements, in EUROPEAN AND US
CONSTITUTIONALISM 3, 10 (Georg Nolte ed., 2005) (noting that because human dignity is a
"comparatively modern legal term ... it is ... not surprising that it is not mentioned in the U.S.
Constitution" but is included in postwar European constitutions and other international human
rights documents).
See, e.g., RONALD DWORKIN, FREEDOM'S LAw 2 (1996) (advocating a moral reading of the
Constitution, which proposes the invocation of principles of justice and political decency to
protect individual rights); RONALD DwORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY, at vii (1977) ("de-
fin[ing] and defend[ing] a liberal theory of law" while criticizing what he describes as the rul-
ing theory, which is based in legal positivism and utilitarianism); Jordan J. Paust, Human Dignity
as a Constitutional Right: A Jurisprudentially Based Inquiry into Criteria and Content, 27 HOW. L.J.
145, 148-49 (1984) (noting that, although there has been recent use by the U.S. Supreme
Court of the principle of human dignity, there has been more extensive use of the concept un-
der international law); James Q. Whitman, 'Human Dignity' in Europe and the United States: The
Social Foundations, in EUROPEAN AND US CONSTITUTIONALISM, supra note 1, at 108, 108-09
(drawing on "historical sociology" to explain the weakness of "human dignity, as Europeans
conceive it" in the United States). But see Walter F. Murphy, An Ordering of Constitutional Values,
53 S. CAL. L. REv. 703, 758 (1980) (concluding that "[t]he fundamental value that constitution-
alism protects is human dignity").
3 See DONALD P. KOMMERS, THE CONSTITUTIONALJURISPRUDENCE OF THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC
OF GERMANY 359 (2d ed. 1997) ("[Human dignity] is the formative principle in terms of which
all other constitutional values are defined and explained."); David Kretzmer, Human Dignity in
Israeli Jurisprudence, in THE CONCEPT OF HUMAN DIGNITY IN HUMAN RIGHTS DISCOURSE, supra
note 1, at 161, 168 ("The perception of human dignity as a general value has enabled the Court
to resort to the concept in order to create rights in various situations. Thus, it has held that
human dignity implies one's right to know the identity of one's parents, the right of a man to
grow a beard, the right of a person not to be subject to sexual harassment, the right of a de-
tained person that his family be informed of his whereabouts, the right of the family of a de-
ceased person to hold a decent funeral and to determine the inscription on the tombstone, the
right to parenthood, the right of a spouse to maintenance, and the right of an adult to be
adopted by a family with whom he has a special relationship." (footnotes omitted)).
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speech should be viewed as contending rather than harmonious val-
ues. This Article offers a theoretical analysis regarding the inade-
quacy of human dignity as an independent justification for freedom
of expression and demonstrates how some Western legal systems'
nearly exclusive focus on human dignity may prove unsatisfactory
when dealing with free speech issues.
Part I reviews the evolution of freedom of expression in the
United States in comparison with other Western democracies. Part II
then briefly reviews common justifications for freedom of expression
through the "classical model" for free speech. This serves as back-
ground for Part III, which assesses the appropriateness of human
dignity as an independent free speech justification. This Part offers
several parameters that assist in predicting whether a nation's human
dignity focus is likely to justify protecting speech or restricting it.
These parameters are then applied to the United States and other
Western democracies to demonstrate why, in the United States, hu-
man dignity is likely to be construed as protecting free speech,
whereas in other Western democracies, human dignity is likely to be
construed as restricting speech. Finally, due to the problematic
nexus of human dignity and freedom of expression from both theo-
retical and comparative standpoints, driving a wedge between the two
is recommended.
I. THE EVOLUTION OF FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION IN THE UNITED
STATES AS COMPARED WITH OTHER WESTERN DEMOCRACIES
Freedom of expression is one of the most universally prominent
rights in all democratic legal systems. Although the protection of
freedom of expression was not developed in most Western democra-
cies fifty or even thirty years ago, most democracies have started de-
veloping protective freedom of expression jurisprudence in the past
ten to twenty-five years.4 Currently, freedom of expression is consid-
ered a prominent right among virtually all Western democracies, yet
its scale and scope vary among different systems. The United States is
probably the most protective of (most) speech rights among Western
, Frederick Schauer, Freedom of Expression Adjudication in Europe and the United States: A Case
Study in Comparative Constitutional Architecture, in EUROPEAN AND US CONSTITUTIONALISM, supra
note 1, at 49, 58 [hereinafter Schauer, Freedom of Expression Adjudication].
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democracies-a phenomenon that receives the label "American Ex-
ceptionalism.,6
Free expression rights are initially structured in accordance with a
nation's common conception of those rights, as well as the ability of a
nation's derived rules to withstand change over time. In the United
States, freedom of expression doctrines crystallized long before they
did so in other Western democracies. The First Amendment was
drafted and ratified more than two centuries ago, and although a
small portion of its development happened in the nineteenth cen-
tury,7 most of its development by the Supreme Court began in the
early twentieth century." The roots of the First Amendment and its
interpretations are planted in libertarianism and the Enlightenment.9
These characteristics are also manifested in the "absolutist view" of
the First Amendment-a view which still affects First Amendment
understandings.10 The Founding Fathers' Lockean influences and
5 For an exception to this rule, see Roger Errera, Freedom of Speech in Europe, in EUROPEAN
AND US CONSTITUTIONALISM, supra note 1, at 23, 45-46, who observed that European law may
be more favorable to journalists than American law because "the First Amendment may not be
invoked by journalists who are called as witnesses or under a subpoena to refuse to disclose the
source of their information."
6 To be precise, "American Exceptionalism" describes a broader concept than one pertain-
ing solely to freedom of expression; it refers to matters in which the United States diverges from
most Western democracies, such as the death penalty and compliance with various international
law norms. See generally Frederick Schauer, The Exceptional First Amendment, in AMERICAN
EXCEPTIONALISM AND HUMAN RIGHTS 29 (Michael Ignatieff ed., 2005) [hereinafter Schauer, The
Exce'tional First Amendment].
See generally DAVID M. RABBAN, FREE SPEECH IN ITS FORGOTrEN YEARS (1997) (describing
the transformations that took place in American free speech law and liberalism between 1870
and 1920); JUHANI RUDANKO, THE FORGING OF FREEDOM OF SPEECH: ESSAYS ON
ARGUMENTATION IN CONGRESSIONAL DEBATES ON THE BILL OF RIGHTS AND ON THE SEDITION ACT
(2003) (discussing the development of free speech law during the late eighteenth and early
nineteenth centuries).
8 See Schauer, Freedom of Expression Adjudication, supra note 4, at 58 n.21 ("The modern era
of free-speech adjudication in the Supreme Court is commonly taken to begin with a series of
important 1919 cases, including Schenck v. United States,... Frohwerk v. United States ... Debs v.
United States.... [and] Abrams v. United States." (citations omitted)).
9 See LEE C. BOLLINGER, THE TOLERANT SOCIETY 44-45 (1998) ("The classical vision of free
speech has antecedents stretching far back in time. The primary connection is with the period
of the Enlightenment, in the eighteenth century, when the interest and faith in man's powers of
reason flourished and when there occurred that enormously important revolution in the way
people conceived of the relationship between the state and the individual members of society.
Two cardinal premises about social organizations arose from this transformation in thought:
first, that the government is possessed of only limited political powers, which it derives from the
citizenry; second, that the people themselves, as the ultimate sovereign, are competent to de-
termine their own destinies." (footnote omitted)).
10 See Guy E. Carmi, Comparative Notions of Fairness: Comparative Perspectives on the Fairness Doc-
trine with Special Emphasis on Israel and the United States, 4 VA. SPORTS & ENT. L.J. 275, 291-92
(2005) (noting that "the absolutist marketplace conception has had a significant influence" on
First Amendment jurisprudence and that the theory "plac[es] its faith in an unregulated mar-
ketplace as the best means of achieving the individual liberty and political discourse that the
First Amendment promises").
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their libertarian perception of rights have affected general percep-
tions of rights in the United States, particularly perceptions of free-
dom of expression."
The formative years of Supreme Court First Amendment jurispru-
dence occurred during the Lochner era2 and the early New Deal pe-
riod." The durability of the First Amendment rules formed during
these years allowed them to withstand influences and trends that were
incompatible with the Lochnerian paradigm. 4 Although the Court
seemed to be more susceptible to progressive liberal notions toward
the middle of the twentieth century, at least in certain free speech
contexts,5 these trends did not last. 6 For the most part, the few mi-
nor influences of this period were later overruled or lost much of
This is somewhat of a generalization, since progressive liberal thought regarding the First
Amendment existed in early periods. See RABBAN, supra note 7, at 211-47 (examining the writ-
ings of progressive intellectuals, especially John Dewey and Herbert Croly, who criticized tradi-
tional notions of American individualism and urged the application of principles of "'socialized
democracy' to the specific issue of free speech"). See generally David M. Rabban, Free Speech in
Progressive Social Thought, 74 TEX. L. REv. 951 (1996) (discussing the philosophies of John
Dewey, Herbert Croly and Roscoe Pound relating to individualism and free speech). Nonethe-
less, the claim that the foundations of the First Amendment are libertarian is an appropriate
portrayal. It does not mean, however, that other nonlibertarian accounts of freedom of expres-
sion are incorrect, or that an originalist interpretation would yield only a libertarian outcome.
Cf David Fontana, Refined Comparativism in Constitutional Law, 49 UCLA L. REv. 539, 575 (2001)
(arguing that "[t]he Founders wanted comparativism to be... a part of constitutional interpre-
tation").
12 See Schauer, The Exceptional First Amendment, supra note 6, at 31 n.4. ("The modern First
Amendment begins in 1919...."); cf ROBERT POST, CONSTITUTIONAL DOMAINS 8-10 (1995)
(claiming that the Court has redefined its understandings of the First Amendment since the
New Deal Era and that "as a consequence the First Amendment was fundamentally reinter-
preted along democratic lines"). I agree with this observation, yet the libertarian instincts (as
opposed to property-related instincts that also characterized the Lochner era) remain un-
changed with regards to the First Amendment since the early free speech rulings in the Lochner
era.
13 The Court has continued its line of protective free speech rulings, even in the context of
protecting labor unions' speech, especially in a series of rulings in 1937. See, e.g., Herndon v.
Lowry, 301 U.S. 242, 258 (1937) (holding that states may not penalize attendance at a meeting
when the meeting was "held with an innocent purpose merely because the meeting was held
under the auspices of an organization membership in which, or the advocacy of whose princi-
ples, is ... denounced as criminal" because doing so violates the freedom of speech); De Jonge
v. Oregon, 299 U.S. 353, 365 (1937) ("[P]eaceable assembly for lawful discussion cannot be
made a crime.").
14 The resilience of First Amendment jurisprudence in the United States derives in large
part from its rule-based characterization. Cf Schauer, The Exceptional First Amendment, supra
note 6, at 54-56 (characterizing American free speech law as rule-oriented, with free speech
rights "defined narrowly" but with "enormous stringency").
15 See, e.g., Red Lion Broad. Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 400-01 (1969) (upholding the consti-
tutionality of the fairness doctrine, which required broadcasters to present public issues and to
allot equal time to each side of such issues); Beauharnais v. Illinois, 343 U.S. 250, 266-67 (1952)
(upholding group defamation legislation).
See, e.g., Carmi, supra note 10, at 287-90 (providing an overview of the erosion of the
American fairness doctrine in telecommunications law).
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their stamina. For instance, several nonlibertarian trends in the
1950s and 1960s that were articulated, for example, in Chaplinsky,
7
were later abandoned and marginalized by the Burger Court. Thus,
in Cohen' and subsequent cases, 9 American free expression doc-
20trines, such as the fighting words doctrine, became more libertarian.
Current First Amendment jurisprudence may be generally charac-
terized as derived from classical libertarian understandings of nega-
tive and "modest" rights.2 ' The laissez-faire approach to freedom of
expression in the United States still reigns, and a positive rights ap-
proach is rejected.22 Because this basic jurisprudence evolved during
a libertarian era, and since freedom of expression is a relatively old
right, it is normally classified as a liberty kind of right, although a free
speech principle must be distinct from a principle of general liberty.2
In fact, freedom of expression is often referred to as "the liberty of
speech. 2 4 Freedom of speech seems to receive heightened protec-
tion vis-A-vis other rights, and "U]ustifications strong enough for the
government to restrict other activities may not be sufficient to restrict
speech. 2" This characteristic is universal, yet is more evident in the
17 Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 573 (1942) (creating the "fighting words"
doctrine, which allows the regulation of speech "likely to cause an average addressee to fight").
18 Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15 (1971) (ruling that a shirt with the inscription "Fuck the
Draft" is protected speech, and does not constitute "fighting words").
19 See, e.g., Lewis v. City of New Orleans, 415 U.S. 130, 133-34 (1974) (holding unconstitu-
tional a statute that prohibited "opprobrious words and abusive language" because, although
the category includes "fighting words," it is vague and overbroad, covering more speech than
can be constitutionally regulated); Brown v. Oklahoma, 408 U.S. 914 (1972) (vacating a crimi-
nal conviction for obscene language and remanding the case for reconsideration in light of
Cohen and Gooding v. Wilson, 405 U.S. 518 (1922)); Rosenfeld v. NewJersey, 408 U.S. 901 (1972)
(same); Gooding v. Wilson, 405 U.S. 518, 521-22 (1972) (holding unconstitutional for vague-
ness and overbreadth an "opprobrious and abusive" statute like the one in Lewis); see also Don-
ald A. Downs, Skokie Revisited: Hate Group Speech and the First Amendment, 60 NOTRE DAME L. REV.
629, 635 n.26 (1985) (listing similar cases).
20 See Downs, supra note 19, at 635-36 ("Following Cohen, the Court applied this new libertar-
ian approach to fighting words cases."). See also infra Part III.C.2.c.
21 See Carmi, supra note 10, at 303 ("The notion of positive rights is inconsistent with liber-
tarian approaches to constitutional law in the United States, which perceive constitutional
rights... as 'relatively modest,' negating positive enforcement of rights by the state.").
22 See Susan J. Brison, The Autonomy Defense of Free Speech, 108 ETHICS 312, 339 (1998)
("'[F]ree speech [is] the only area where laissez-faire is still respectable."' (quoting Aaron Di-
rector, The Parity of the Economic Marketplace, 7J.L. &ECON. 1, 5 (1964))).
23 Cf FREDERICK SCHAUER, FREE SPEECH: A PHILOSOPHICAL ENQUIRY 7-8 (1982) [hereinafter
SCHAUER, PHILOSOPHICAL ENQUIRY] ("[T]he analysis of freedom of speech can and should be
separated from questions about the limits of governmental authority in a broader sense."); Kent
Greenawalt, Free Speech Justifications, 89 COLUM. L. REV. 119, 121-23 (1989) (arguing that, "to be
significant," a principle of free speech must go beyond a minimal liberty principle). Nonethe-
less, the core of classical understandings of freedom of expression is heavily linked to concep-
tions of liberty. For elaboration on classical negative rights, see discussion infra Part III.C.2.c.
24 See, e.g., HCJ 14/86 Laor v. Film Review Board [19871 IsrSC 41(1) 421,426.
,5 KENT GREENAWALT, FIGHTING WORDS 3 (1995) [hereinafter GREENAWALT, FIGHTING
WORDS]. See, e.g., Brison, supra note 22, at 320 (citing Schauer and Greenawalt for the proposi-
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American legal system, whose freedom of expression protection
stands out from other Western democracies.2 6 This core classical un-
derstanding of freedom of expression may require some nonliberty
considerations to camouflage themselves as liberty-related so as tojus-
tify their use in this "liberty" kind of right. This may explain why con-
siderations from another order-for example, human dignity-use
liberty terminology such as "autonomy," or classify the use of human
dignity as "dignity-based liberalism.
2 7
Rule-based First Amendment jurisprudence has generally been
successful in delimiting the types of arguments admissible when it
comes to free speech. These rules stabilize constitutional discourse
and applicable terminology in the realm of free speechs.2  The under-
standings that are attached to the First Amendment and its jurispru-
dence became rule-based, and to a great extent fixed,2 at a time
ton that regulation of speech requires a more compelling justification than regulation of most
non-speech activities); Greenawalt, Free Speech Justifications, supra note 23, at 120 (describing pro-
tection for free speech as implying protection beyond ordinary limits on governmental regula-
tion of other activities).
26 For elaboration on the phenomenon of American Exceptionalism in the realm of free
speech, see Schauer, The Exceptional First Amendment, supra note 6. It should be noted that
American constitutional law provides additional protections of individual liberties not found in
other European countries. For example, criminal procedures such as the fruit of the poisonous
tree doctrine do not exist in European countries, nor does a right to ajury trial or some other
civil rights. See generally Mohammed Saif-Alden Wattad, Did God Say, 'You Shall Not Eat of Any Tree
of the Garden?' Rethinking the "Fruits of the Poisonous Tree" in Israeli Constitutional Law, 2005
OXFORD U. COMP. L.F., http://ouclf.iuscomp.org/articles/wattad.shtml, at nn.29-46 and ac-
companying text (surveying approaches to "fruits of the poisonous tree" in Western legal sys-
tems). Therefore, since these rights are better protected in the United States, even if European
countries provide a relatively robust protection to freedom of expression vis-A-vis other rights,
American Exceptionalism in free speech protection most likely does not stem from a degrada-
tion of freedom of expression as opposed to other rights in other democracies. In other words,
if we look at protection of other rights as a threshold from which the protection of freedom of
expression should be elevated, then all Western democracies follow this line of free speech pro-
tection, at least to a certain extent.
27Cf Donald P. Kommers, Foreword to EDWARD J. EBERLE, DIGNITY AND LIBERTY:
CONSTITUTIONAL VISIONS IN GERMANY AND THE UNITED STATES, at xi, xi-xii (2002) (noting the
"blend[ing] together" of liberty and dignity in the constitutional jurisprudence of the United
States and Germany).
28 For elaboration on rule-based jurisprudence, see David L. Faigman, Constitutional Adven-
tures in Wonderland: Exploring the Debate Between Rules and Standards Through the Looking Glass of
the First Amendment, 44 HASTINGS L.J. 829, 841 (1993), which explains the benefits of explicitly
stating standards: full explanation of the standards underlying constitutional decisions fosters
"full, open and informed discussion" and Schauer, The Exceptional First Amendment, supra note 6,
at 55-56, which notes that rule-based analysis may provide advantages over more open-ended
inquiries in dealing with increasing volumes of free speech claims. See also Edward Lee, Rules
and Standards for Cyberspace, 77 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 1275, 1312-16 (2002) (arguing that clear
rules "reduce the cost of decisionmaking ..... promote stability ..... [and] facilitate predict-
ability and private planning").
This rule-based characteristic of First Amendment jurisprudence is a "managerial argu-
ment" that may explain why doctrinal change in the United States occurs more slowly than in
other Western democracies. See POST, supra note 12, at 4-6 (describing rule-based systems as
[Vol. 9:4
DIGNITY-THE ENEMY FROM WITHIN
when other perceptions of rights, particularly human dignity,30 either
did not exist or were not substantiated enough to claim the lead.'
In contrast to the United States, freedom of expression jurispru-
dence in most Western democracies began evolving in the past ten to
twenty-five years.32 During this period, the more "fashionable" rights
in Europe had a nonlibertarian character. 33 Social and positive rights
were increasingly recognized in Western countries, many of which
even defined themselves as welfare states. In addition, during the
same period, scholarly writings refrained problematic speech, such as
hate speech and pornography, in terms of inequality rather than
regulation of civility and morality.3 4  Therefore, when some non-
management tools that seek to create incentives and that are less responsive to shifting com-
munity values than other systems). Stare decisis serves as a buffer that moderates change and
promotes stability. This relatively slow change in American constitutional jurisprudence vis-i-vis
other Western democracies may be yet another explanation for American Exceptionalism. The
non-rule-based constitutional jurisprudence that characterizes other Western democracies fa-
cilitates more frequent discussions regarding the balancing of different rights, although stare
decisis plays a role in these systems as well. When compared to other legal systems, it seems the
American system prefers stability to constant debate regarding its values. See id. at 4-6 (discuss-
ing the social order of "management"). For a claim that First Amendment jurisprudence is not
rule-based, see Eugene Volokh, Freedom of Speech, Permissible Tailoring and Transcending Strict Scru-
tiny, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 2417, 2438-41 (1996), which describes and rejects arguments that strict
scrutiny is really a balancing inquiry of the type seen in non-ruled-based jurisdictions. Nonethe-
less, when compared to other Western countries, the United States is clearly rule-based in its
free speech jurisprudence.
Human dignity emerged as a constitutional concept primarily at the end of World War II.
See supra note 1. By then, much First Amendment jurisprudence had been outlined and crystal-
lized. See supra note 8 and accompanying text.
3 Some nonlibertarian, or dignity-based, justifications for speech regulation, for example,
protecting group members from defamation, that were promoted by some scholars, see, e.g.,
David Riesman, Democracy and Defamation: Control of Group Libel, 42 COLUM. L. REV. 727 (1942),
were initially adopted by the Supreme Court but were later rejected. See, e.g., R.A.V. v. City of
St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 391-93 (1992) (holding that the ordinance prohibiting "fighting words"
that invoke "race, color, creed, religion or gender" is unconstitutional viewpoint discrimination,
thereby implicitly overruling Beauharnais); Beauharnais v. Illinois, 343 U.S. 250, 257-59 (1952)
(holding constitutional an imposition of liability by a state for libel against a group); see also
Robert M. O'Neil, Rights in Conflict: The First Amendment's Third Century, 65 LAW & CONTEMP.
PROBS. 7, 23-27 (2002) (tracing the history of laws aimed at discriminatory speech or group
libel).
32 Schauer, Freedom of Expression Adjudication, supra note 4, at 58. Although the United King-
dom, for example, had relatively robust free speech protection earlier than the last ten to
twenty-five years, its free speech doctrines were not as developed as their American counter-
parts. In particular, the lack ofjudicial review restricted the remedies in free speech cases. See
generally HARRY STREET, FREEDOM, THE INDIVIDUAL AND THE LAW 53-155 (1963) (summarizing
various British protections for the freedom of expression).
33 Cf Winfried Brugger, Comment, in EUROPEAN AND US CONSTITUTIONALISM, supra note 1, at
69, 72-74 (discussing differences in European and American values).
3 The writings of Andrea Dworkin and Catharine MacKinnon support this proposition. See,
e.g., ANDREA DWORKIN, PORNOGRAPHY: MEN POSSESSING WOMEN (1981); ANDREA DWORKIN &
CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, PORNOGRAPHY AND CIVIL RIGHTS: A NEW DAY FOR WOMEN'S
EQUALITY (1988); CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, FEMINISM UNMODIFIED: DISCOURSES ON LIFE AND
LAW 148, 156 (1987); Andrea Dworkin, Against the Male Flood: Censorship, Pornography, and Equal-
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American courts dealt with these kinds of speech, they viewed them
differently than American courts did in the 1960s. This may partially
explain the substantial differences in free expression jurisprudence
that divide the United States from the majority of Western democra-
cies, including most European nations, Canada, New Zealand and
Australia.3'
Furthermore, post-World War II European human rights dis-
course, which introduced human dignity as a central constitutional
value and pivotal right, is founded upon different philosophical heri-
tages than the American rights discourse. These include Hegelian,
Kantian and even theological Judeo-Christian perceptions of rights.
36
Although there is no consensus as to both the origins and the present
conception of human dignity, its most prevalent understandings are
non-libertarian, as opposed to the libertarian understandings of the
American Lockeian tradition.
Freedom of expression in Western democracies is viewed as an in-
tegral part of general constitutional law, whereas in the United States
it is perceived as a more independent field. Therefore, general con-
stitutional doctrines affect freedom of expression doctrines in most
Western democracies to a greater extent than in the United States.
For example, in most Western democracies, freedom of expression
may be considered to be a positive right, rather than merely a liber-
tarian negative right, as in the United States. 3  Also, the distinction
between the public and private spheres plays a significant role in de-
termining some free speech doctrines, such as the regulation of me-
dia.39
ity, 8 HARV. WOMEN'S L.J. 1, 15-17 (1985); see also MariJ. Matsuda, Public Response to Racist Speech:
Considering the Victim's Story, 87 MICH. L. REV. 2320 (1989).
35 It appears that the comparative argument, according to which the United States should
align with the other Western democracies and restrict radical speech, is generally unpersuasive
in the American context. But see Brison, supra note 22, at 339 (arguing that, in the balancing of
liberty and equality, equality receives "priority" and that this priority should apply to issues sur-
rounding hate speech); Mark Tushnet, The Possibilities of Comparative Constitutional Law, 108
YALE L.J. 1225, 1238 (1999) (arguing that "looking elsewhere" to other countries' constitutional
law might not "dramatically alter" the conclusions reached by American judges).
36 See, e.g., Brugger, supra note 33, at 79 (contrasting European reliance on Kant with Ameri-
can reliance on Locke); Winfried Brugger, Communitarianism as the Social and Legal Theory Behind
the German Constitution, 2 INT'LJ. CONST. L. 431 (2004) [hereinafter, Brugger, Communitarian-
ism]; Dietrich Ritschl, Can Ethical Maxims be Derived from Theological Concepts of Human Dignity?, in
THE CONCEPT OF HUMAN DIGNITY IN HUMAN RIGHTS DISCOURSE, supra note 1, at 87 & passim
(exploring the relationships among theological systems, ethical principles and legal uses of
"human dignity").
See supra notes 23-26 and accompanying text.
See Carmi, supra note 10, at 300-05, for a description of three different approaches to the
fairness doctrine. The differences among these approaches can be seen to depend, in part, on
whether a nation treats free speech as a positive right or as a bar to governmental interference.
39 See id. at 286 & passim (describing the effect of the public/private distinction on an en-
tity's obligations under Israeli law). See generally ERIC M. BARENDT, BROADCASTING LAW: A
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Because of their relative youth, free expression doctrines in other
Western democracies are still in the formative stage. Other Western
democracies are less restrained by existing doctrine, and, unlike the
United States, their free expression doctrines may be characterized as
non-rule-based.4 ° Instead of rules, these countries frequently utilize
concepts of balancing and proportionality. In particular, freedom of
speech is balanced with other values, rights and interests.4  Among
these values and rights, human dignity surfaces prominently in many
Western democracies, particularly in Germany, where it receives
heightened status vis-a-vis other rights.
Thus, as will be demonstrated later, while the United States views
freedom of speech through the lens of "liberty," other Western de-
mocracies increasingly think of freedom of expression in dignity
terms. The predominance of human dignity as a constitutional value
in many Western democracies has caused an increasing number of
them to redefine freedom of expression issues in dignity terms.42 In
these countries human dignity may serve as an internal limitation on
free speech. At the very least, dignity concerns in these countries are
presented when freedom of speech cases are adjudicated and bal-
anced vis-a.-vis free 4speech, creating an external limitation on free-
dom of expression.
It is important to understand that the American libertarian free
speech paradigm is not completely rejected by other democracies.
Such democracies often utilize a similar approach when core and
classical freedom of expression issues are involved.44 This is true in
particular in cases of governmental censorship and prior restraint.
45
COMPARATIVE STUDY 50-95 (1995) (providing an overview of public and private broadcasting
schemes).
40 See Schauer, Freedom of Expression Adjudication, supra note 4, at 49-51, 61-63 (noting the
structural and substantive differences between American and European speech doctrines);
Schauer, The Exceptional First Amendment, supra note 6, at 53-56 (describing American speech
doctrine as more rigid and rule-bound than its European counterparts).
4 On the distinction between these constitutional terms, see infra text accompanying notes
172-75.
42 Among these countries are Germany, South Africa and Israel. See discussion infra Part
III.C.1.
43 These countries include virtually all other Western democracies. See discussion supra note
34 and accompanying text.
44 See, e.g., Fredrick Schauer, The Ontology of Censorship, in CENSORSHIP AND SILENCING:
PRACTICES OF CULTURAL REGULATION 147, 147 (Robert Post ed., 1998) (reviewing trends in and
approaches toward censorship); Ignacio de la Rasilla del Moral, The Increasingly Marginal Appre-
ciation of The Margin-of-Appreciation Doctrine, 7 GERMAN L.J. 611, 615, 618 (2006) (noting that the
European Court on Human Rights gives more latitude to restriction of speech that offends mo-
ralit than to political censorship).
Compare Errera, supra note 5, at 31-32 (referring to a relatively narrow "margin of appre-
ciation" in the ECHR free expression jurisprudence when it comes to issues of political speech,
as opposed to a wider margin when dealing with issues such as enforcement of morality), with
Andrew Oliver, The Proposed European Union Ban on Television Advertising Targeting Children:
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In these fields the libertarian perceptions that stem from the fear of
excessive state control of speech are commonly shared by democra-
cies, especially regarding political speech.4 6 Nonetheless, as general
attitudes about free expression move further away from core classical
paradigms, other democracies increasingly recognize additional con-
siderations that warrant limitations and restrictions on free speech.
This is especially true regarding "problematic speech, 47 as well as me-
dia regulation. s
Although understanding freedom of expression as derived from
the narrow principles of liberty in the classic liberal paradigm is very
beneficial when thinking about free speech, it is an insufficient ex-
planation on its own. It is therefore necessary to review briefly the
theoretical justifications for free speech to demonstrate the inappro-
priateness of human dignity as a central justification for free speech.
II. THE THEORETICALJUSTIFICATIONS FOR FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION-
AN OVERVIEW
Freedom of expression has several underlying justifications that
are commonly used to explicate the strong defense afforded to
speech.49 Briefly reviewing the basic purposes behind the "rule" of
free speech is important in order to evaluate human dignity as ajusti-
fication for free speech. As this Article endeavors to show, human
dignity is not suitable to justify freedom of expression. Human dig-
nity fails as an overarching justification for freedom of expression be-
cause it does not appropriately cover some core protected speech. It
Would It Violate European Human Rights Law?, 20 N.Y.L. SCH.J. INT'L & COMP. L. 501, 517 (2000)
(arguing that when States limit speech to protect morals, "the ECHR gives the states extremely
wide latitude in determining exactly what morals are, and what is necessity [sic] to protect
them").
46 Cf infra Part II.A.2 (regarding the increased popularity of the "arguments from democ-
racy" as part of the general ontology of First Amendment jurisprudence, which relies heavily on
this argument when dealing with all kinds of speech).
47 "Problematic speech" refers to speech that democracies other than the United States limit
(i.e., hate speech, Holocaust denial, and in some cases, pornography). Defamation may also
fall under this category in certain respects. The term is a useful shorthand for the kinds of
speech that are restricted by some or most other Western democracies. See, e.g., BOLLINGER,
supra note 9, at 185 (referring to obscenity as speech of problematic character).
For a discussion of the difference between the non-American approach, which may be
characterized as fitting into the "Madisonian" approach to free speech, as opposed to the
American approach, which reflects a more "absolutist" viewpoint at its core, see Carmi, supra
note 10, at 290-96, 300-05.
See GEOFFREY R. STONE ET AL., CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1054-60 (5th ed. 2005) (detailing
three primary rationales for the protection of free speech, including the search for truth, self-
governance, and self-fulfillment/autonomy rationales, and other less frequendy cited ration-
ales, which include the checking value, the tolerant society, free speech and character, and con-
formity and dissent).
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also confers excessive protection on speech that is already adequately
protected under current understandings.
Many legal scholars and philosophers have attempted to define
the underlying justification for freedom of expression. These differ-
ent accounts sometimes offer similar descriptions of the same ration-
ales.50 The subtleties these writings offer are not directly relevant in
defining the rapport between freedom of expression and human
dignity. Therefore there is no need to delve deeply into such nu-
ances. Suffice it to say that the brief account offered below demon-
strates how dignity concerns are far from the core of the common jus-
tifications for free speech and are, at best, in the penumbra of these
justifications. Therefore, human dignity cannot stand as a primary
prism through which freedom of expression is viewed.
A common and helpful way to distinguish among different free
speech justifications is to divide them into consequential and non-
consequential arguments. 5' Consequential reasons for protecting
free speech focus on the positive effects of liberty, whereas noncon-
sequential reasons claim that, independent of consequences, the re-
striction of speech denies a right or constitutes an injustice. 2
A. The Classical Model
Three main free speech justifications (or clusters of justifica-
tions)-the arguments from truth, democracy and autonomy-are
50 See Greenawalt, Free Speech Justifications, supra note 23, at 130-47 (counting the following
consequentialist justifications for free speech: "truth discovery, interest accommodation and
social stability, exposure and deterrence of abuses of authority, autonomy and personality de-
velopment .... liberal democracy" and the "promot[ion] [of] tolerance"); id. at 147-54 (listing
the following nonconsequentialist justifications: "social contract theory,... respect for indi-
vidual autonomy [and rationality,] .... [belief in] dignity and equality .... [and commitment
to] the marketplace of ideas"); cf Brison, supra note 22, at 321-22 (setting forth several conse-
quentialist arguments for free speech, including "the argument from truth, the argument from
diversity, the argument from democracy, the argument from distrust, the argument from toler-
ance, the pressure release argument, and the slippery slope argument," while noting that each
justification is weak because it relies on a tenuous balancing between the "controversial empiri-
cal claims about the positive effects of free speech and the negative effects of restrictions" that
leaves free speech vulnerable to a change in perception about the benefits of either (footnotes
omitted)).
51 See Greenawalt, Free Speech Justications, supra note 23, at 127 (explaining that there is "no
single correct way of presenting the justifications ... of free speech," but the consequential-
ist/nonconsequentialist distinction is useful "because it differentiates claimed reasons that are
to be viewed in light of factual evidence and claimed reasons that rest more purely on norma-
tive claims").
52 See GREENAWALT, FIGHTING WORDS, supra note 25, at 3 (noting that consequentialistjusti-
fications for free speech, such as those used by John Stuart Mill, Oliver Wendell Holmes and
Louis Brandeis, concentrate on the positive effects of liberty such as free speech's ability to aid
in the discovery of truth).
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widely referred to as "the classical model. ' 3 This model offers expla-
nations regarding the "core" of free speech-the speech that is "truly
value[d]" by society. 54  While "theorists disagree regarding which
identifiable 'values' ought to be given precedence over others, 55 the
"truth" and "democratic" arguments are generally perceived as the
most powerful free speech justifications, especially in the United
States. This Article will first review these two justifications, later
elaborating on the additional autonomy-related justification, since it
is the only justification from the classical model that may be directly
linked to human dignity.
1. The Argumentfrom Truth
The "discovery of truth" rationale is probably the most familiar
consequentialist argument. 56  It is most closely identified with the
writings of John Stuart Mill and the "eloquent Supreme Court opin-
ions of Oliver Wendell Holmes and Louis Brandeis.5 7 At the core of
this argument is the notion that free speech is the best tool to dis-
cover truth and prove falsehood. 5s According to this argument, the
"marketplace of ideas 55 is the best mechanism to reach truth; regulat-
ing speech may eventually stifle truth instead of promoting it.6° While
the argument from truth has been a prominent and popular justifica-
tion for the protection of free speech, it is second to the cluster of ar-
53 It is important to note that there are more theoretical justifications than the three pre-
sented. The classical model falls short of offering a satisfactory explanation for the level of pro-
tection that freedom of expression receives, especially in the United States. Several theorists
have articulated other justifications, or dissected the justifications into sub-justifications. See,
e.g., Brison, supra note 22, at 320-21 (mentioning additional common defenses of free speech).
But the three justifications I have chosen to briefly present are used by many as the major classi-
fications, and are known as the classical model. See generally BOLLINGER, supra note 9, at 43-75
(discussing "the classical model and its limits"). Lee Bollinger's "fortress model" and Vince
Blasi's "checking value" deserve a special mention among the additional alternative justifica-
tions referred to above. See id. at 76-103; Vincent Blasi, The Checking Value in First Amendment
Theory, 1977 AM. B. FOUNDATION REs.J. 521.
54 BOLLINGER, supra note 9, at 44.
55 Id.
56 GREENAWALT, FIGHTING WORDS, supra note 25, at 3.
57 Id.; see also RAPHAEL COHEN-ALMAGOR, THE BOUNDARIES OF LIBERTY AND TOLERANCE: THE
STRUGGLE AGAINST KAHANISM IN ISRAEL 145-47 (1994); JOHN STUART MILL, ON LIBERTY 15-52
(Elizabeth Rapaport ed., Hackett Publ'g. Co. 1978) (1859) (discussing the harm principle).
18 See Greenawalt, Free SpeechJustifications, supra note 23, at 130-31.
59 For an elaboration on the sources of the "marketplace of ideas" metaphor, see Charles W.
Logan, Jr., Getting Beyond Scarcity: A New Paradigm for Assessing the Constitutionality of Broadcast
Regulation, 85 CAL. L. REv. 1687, 1717-18 (1997).
See MILL, supra note 57, at 19 (arguing that free discussion will root out error). See gener-
ally STONE, supra note 49, at 1054-56 (citing two enunciations of the marketplace of ideas: Jus-
tice Holmes' dissent in Abrams v. United States and John Stuart Mill's explanation of the rationale
in On Liberty, while noting other observations about truth and in what conditions it will flour-
ish).
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guments relating to democracy and self-governance, especially in the
American context.
2. The Argument from Democracy
The argument from democracy and self-governance is most
61
closely identified with the work of Alexander Meiklejohn. It is con-
sidered to be the most prominent justification for the protection of
free speech. The argument focuses on the importance of free speech
for enabling the citizenry to self-govern. The ethos of free expression
in the United States is closely linked to this rationale, and the evolu-
tionary development of free speech doctrines suggests that political
speech stands at the core of First Amendment protection.2 Historical
events such as the McCarthy Era and the Vietnam War contributed to
the American understanding of the First Amendment as a tool for
protecting political speech. Political speech normally receives the
highest protection, but in the United States this protection exceeds
that afforded in many other Western democracies, as demonstrated
by such policies as the content neutrality doctrine and the clear-and-
present-danger test.64
The popularity of the argument from democracy is unparalleled;
it is considered the most influential justification in the development
of twentieth-century free speech doctrines both in the United States
and elsewhere.6" Nonetheless, the centrality of the argument from
democracy in the United States is greater than in other legal systems,
and First Amendment doctrines and conceptions are primarily de-
61 See generally ALEXANDER MEIKLEJOHN, FREE SPEECH AND ITS RELATION TO SELF-
GOVERNMENT (1948). Some scholars link the American ethos of free speech to the Founding
Fathers' generation, particularly to Thomas Jefferson and James Madison. See, e.g., ZECHARIAH
CHAFEE,JR., FREEDOM OF SPEECH 17-21 (1920) (discussing the history of the free speech clause
in the Continental Congress, state constitutions and state ratifying conventions); id. at 30-31
(discussing free speech in relation to the Sedition Act of 1798); THOMAS I. EMERSON, THE
SYSTEM OF FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION 99-101 (1970) (same).
62 See, e.g., N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 269-70 (1964) (describing the security of
"freedom of expression upon public questions" as "long... settled" and noting "a profound
national commitment to the principle that debate on public issues should be uninhibited, ro-
bust, and wide-open, and that it may well include vehement, caustic, and sometimes unpleas-
ant% sharp attacks on government and public officials").
Schauer, The Exceptional First Amendment, supra note 6, at 47-49.
6 See id. at 48.
65 Greenawalt, Free Speech Justifications, supra note 23, at 145 (1989) ("Arguments from de-
mocracy have been said in a comparative study to be the 'most influential ... in the develop-
ment of twentieth-century free speech law.'" (quoting E. BARENDT, FREEDOM OF SPEECH 23
(1985)). But see ERIC BARENDT, FREEDOM OF SPEECH 20-23 (1985) (pointing out that the argu-
ment from democracy cannot be the sole explanation for free speech because it raises certain
questions, such as "[i] f the maintenance of democracy is the foundation for free speech, how is
one to argue against the regulation or suppression of that speech by the democracy acting
through its elected representatives?").
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66
rived from this justification. The primacy of the argument from
democracy in the American setting is exemplified by the classification
of pornography as political speech, 67 and by the use of democratic ra-
tionales to protect commercial speech. 68 Other democracies, while
recognizing the importance of this argument, seem less prone to use
democracy rationales to justify free speech protection, instead favor-
ing others from the plethora of existing free speech justifications. 9
America's reliance on the argument from democracy in forming its
First Amendment jurisprudence, especially in non-political contexts,
is quite unique. This legal-cultural aspect of American free expres-
sion jurisprudence may serve as yet another explanation for "Ameri-
can Exceptionalism."'0
3. The Argument from Autonomy
Another cluster of justifications regarding the underlying pur-
poses of free speech is the autonomy defense, which is also related to
self-fulfillment. Many theorists have attempted to shed light on this
argument, and "[t]he autonomy defense of free speech is arguably
the one most commonly used by liberal legal and political theo-
ists .... Brison counts as many as six different philosophical ac-
counts of autonomy.72  Principally, "the argument from auton-
omy.., maintains that not to honor an individual's choice to speak-
66 See, e.g., MEIKLEJOHN, supra note 61, at 104-05 (arguing that the First Amendment does
not guarantee "men freedom to say what some private interest pays them to say," but only free-
dom "to say what, as citizens, they think, what they believe, about the general welfare"); Cass R.
Sunstein, Free Speech Now, 59 U. CHI. L. REv. 255, 301 (1992) (arguing that the original concep-
tion of the First Amendment was "principally about political deliberation"); see also Gregory P.
Magarian, Substantive Due Process as a Source of Constitutional Protection for Nonpolitical Speech, 90
MINN. L. REv. 247, 253-54 (2005) (discussing Meiklejohn's public right theory of freedom of
expression, according to which political speech is the main object of free expression and free
expression is "a Madisonian means to the end of democratic government").
67 See Am. Booksellers Ass'n, Inc. v. Hudnut, 771 F.2d 323, 325 (7th Cir. 1985) (invalidating
an Indianapolis ordinance that outlawed all speech meeting the ordinance's definition of "por-
nography," regardless of the "literary, artistic, or political qualities" of the speech), affd, 475
U.S. 1001 (1986); Alon Harel, Bigotry, Pornography, and the First Amendment: A Theory of Unpro-
tected Speech, 65 S. CAL. L. REV. 1887, 1888 (1992) (noting the "judicial classification [of racist
and pornographic speech] as political in nature"); cf CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, ONLY WNORDS
92-93 (1993) (criticizing Judge Easterbrook's opinion in American Booksellers, 771 F.2d 323, for
"imolicitly applying the political speech model" to pornography).
See, e.g., Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748
(1976) (referring to the public's right to be exposed to commercials through similar rationales
for the exposure of the public to political speech).
For a good account of prevalent free speech justifications, see Greenawalt, Free SpeechJusti-
fications, supra note 23. See also GREENAWALT, FIGHTING WORDS, supra note 25.
70 Schauer, supra note 6 and accompanying text.
71 Brison, supra note 22, at 312-13.
72 Id. at 324-39 (discussing the merits of six accounts of autonomy and the extent to which
these accounts provide robust justifications for free speech).
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or to receive others' speech-would violate that person's right to
autonomy.01 Most accounts of the autonomy defense are nonconse-
quentialist and therefore, according to Brison, aim to show "why the
right to free speech is immune to balancing.,
74
There is no need to dwell on all the different philosophical ac-
counts Brison offers in order to realize that the vagueness of the term
"autonomy," and its different philosophical meanings, renders a
complex outcome. Most of the accounts Brison presents favor the
protection of free speech even when hate speech and pornography
are involved. Yet one of the six accounts Brison reviews justifies re-. 71
stricting these kinds of speech due to autonomy considerations.
Therefore, autonomy cannot serve as a silver bullet to solve the issue
of problematic speech, and it may send mixed signals as to the pro-
priety of restricting various kinds of speech. Nonetheless, as dis-
cussed below, autonomy's mainstream understandings are still far
more speech protective than their human dignity counterparts.
Those who use the autonomy argument to protect all kinds of
speech, including problematic speech, emphasize the notion that the
state cannot paternalistically dictate to its citizenry which views are
correct.7" Dworkin, for example, argues that restricting people's
speech, or limiting people's access to others' speech, out of contempt
for their way of life or their view of good violates their right to auton-
omy or "moral independence.7 7  Such restrictions unacceptably fail
to treat these people with equal respect and concern. s Suppression
of certain views represents a kind of contempt for citizens that is ob-
jectionable independent of its consequences. When suppression fa-
vors some points of view over others, it does not treat citizens
equally. 79
73 Id. at 322 (noting that this argument is "typically presented as a nonconsequentialist de-
fense of free speech").
74 Id.
75 See id. at 338 (arguing that a failure to restrict hate speech can sometimes cause "auton-
omy-undermining harms" by "restrict[ing] individuals' employment options, limit[ing] their
political potential, and even undermin[ing] their ability to take advantage of those options that
are available to them").
76 See id. at 316-17 (asserting that liberal theorists agree with libertarians regarding the im-
portance of free speech to individual autonomy).
RONALD DWORKIN, A MATTER OF PRINCIPLE 353 (1985).
78 See Ronald Dworkin, The Coming Battles over Free Speech, N.Y. REv. BOOKS, June 11, 1992, at
58 (reviewing ANTHONY LEWIS, MAKE No LAW: THE SULlIVAN CASE AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT
(1991)) ("[W]e are a liberal society committed to individual moral responsibility, and any cen-
sorship on grounds of content is inconsistent with that commitment."). But see Brison, supra
note 22, at 339 (arguing that autonomy concerns do not prevent regulation of some kinds of
speech and that a failure to regulate certain speech violates the principle of equality).
79 See Greenawalt, Free Speech Justifications, supra note 23, at 152-53 (arguing that "as a matter
of basic human respect .... the government should treat people with dignity and equality").
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Such aspects of the autonomy defense of free speech can be ar-
ticulated in terms of "dignity," "equality" and "liberty."8 ° Yet this ac-
count may be somewhat misleading, since it depends on the content
one ascribes to these terms. The autonomy defense is more compati-
ble with the meanings of these constitutional terms as they are com-
monly viewed in the United States, but the same terms tend to receive
other emphases in other Western countries.8' The autonomy defense
focuses more heavily on the speaker than on his listeners and is, in
fact, closely related to general concepts of "liberty."8"
The autonomy defense is often linked with artistic speech or
speech that defines personality (for example, speech relating to our
sexual identities or personal appearances) since these kinds of speech
lie close to how people conceive of themselves. Such speech is more
closely connected to the autonomy argument, and therefore its pro-
tection primarily depends on the importance this justification is given
in a specific legal system.
The autonomy defense of free speech is of special interest for the
purposes of this analysis, since some versions of the autonomy de-
fense may overlap with some versions of a defense rooted in human
dignity. Therefore, when referring to human dignity as an argument
for protecting free speech, one must refer to the autonomy argu-
ment. Yet focusing solely on the autonomy argument for the protec-
tion of freedom of expression, while abandoning the other primary
classical justifications (particularly, truth and democracy), offers only
a partial foundation for this freedom. The other arguments are at
least as important as the autonomy argument, if not more important.
III. THE "ARGUMENT" FROM DIGNITY
The nexus between human dignity and freedom of expression is
84problematic in nature. The inadequacy of human dignity as a prin-
80 See id. at 153 (noting that "[t]he concerns about dignity and equality may seem not to be
specially related to speech but to be arguments, perhaps rather weak ones, in favor of liberty
generally").
81 See infra Part III.C.2.
82 See Greenawalt, Free Speech Justifications, supra note 23, at 153 ("How to take this argument
depends on whether any infringement of liberty impairs dignity and any infringement that is
significantly selective impairs equality.... The concerns about dignity and equality may seem
not to be specially related to speech but to be arguments, perhaps rather weak ones, in favor of
liberty generally.").
83 See CrimA 4463/94 Golan v. The Penitentiary Service [1996] IsrSC 50(5) 136 (Dorner, J.)
(placing high importance on such speech as protected under the Human Dignity Clause within
Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty); Greenawalt, Free Speech Justifications, supra note 23, at
153 ("Expressions of beliefs and feelings lie closer to the core of our persons than do most ac-
tions we perform .... ").
84 Historically, dignity was used to restrict freedom of expression in several ways, primarily as
a defense against harm to reputation. See generally Robert C. Post, The Social Foundations of Defa-
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ciple justification for freedom of speech is reviewed by Frederick
Schauer, who remarks that "there is little to be gained by thinking of
the right to freedom of speech as but the instantiation of a more
general right to dignity,""5 leading to the declaration that "[s] peaking
about dignity thus appears not to take us very far in thinking about
the protection of freedom of speech.
s6
Nonetheless, human dignity is articulated by some scholars as a
free speech justification. Human dignity is even considered a possi-
ble source for the incorporation of freedom of expression as an un-
enumerated right.87 Unfortunately, it is unclear what exactly the ar-
gument from dignity encompasses. A deeper look into the
relationship between human dignity and freedom of expression re-
veals that the argument from dignity is perceived differently by dif-
ferent scholars.
Should the argument from dignity be recognized as an independ-
ent theoretical free speech justification? This Article claims that such
a view would be mistaken primarily because it is either not sufficiently
distinguishable from the argument from autonomy, or because it is
too general to constitute a free speech justification per se. The fol-
lowing analysis is devoted to demonstrating why human dignity and
freedom of expression are more appropriately conceived of as sepa-
rate rather than as connected.
A. Two Accounts of the Argument from Dignity
What exactly do we mean when considering the argument from
dignity? When someone argues that her right to free speech is de-
mation Law: Reputation and the Constitution, 74 CAL. L. REV. 691, 707-19 (1986) (discussing the
"dignity theory" of reputation); Lisa R. Pruitt, Her Own Good Name: Two Centuies of Talk about
Chastity, 63 MD. L. REV. 401 (2004) (demonstrating the role of dignity in the protection of chas-
tity and morals in nineteenth-century defamation laws).
Frederick Schauer, Speaking of Dignity, in THE CONSTITUTION OF RIGHTS: HUMAN DIGNITY
AND AMERICAN VALUES 178, 179 (MichaelJ. Meyer & William A. Parent eds., 1992) [hereinafter
Schauer, Speaking of Dignity]; cf Daniel Statman, Two Concepts of Dignity, 24 IUNAI MISHPAT 541,
576-77 (2001) (noting that freedom of expression has little to gain from affiliation with dig-
nity).,
Schauer, Speaking of Dignity, supra note 85, at 190.
87 For example, in a fashion similar to the incorporation of the unenumerated right to pri-
vacy into the Fourteenth Amendment in the United States, the Israeli Supreme Court has con-
sidered incorporating the unenumerated right of free speech into the Human Dignity Clause of
Israeli Basic Law. See Golan, IsrSC 50(5) 136 (plurality opinion by the Israeli Supreme Court
that dealt with the possibility of incorporating freedom of expression into the Israeli Basic Laws
via the Human Dignity Clause). Recently, the Israeli Supreme Court chose partial incorpora-
tion of freedom of expression via the Human Dignity Clause. See HCJ 2557/05 Matee Harov v.
Israeli Police [2006] (handed down on 12/12/2006, paragraphs 12-13 of Barak, C.J.) (arguing
that freedom of expression is partially incorporated into the Israeli Basic Laws via the Human
Dignity Clause).
Apr. 2007]
JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
rived from her entitlement to dignity (or alternatively, that certain
speech should be curtailed due to infringement on her dignity), what
does this justification encompass? The vagueness surrounding the
term "human dignity" clutters one's ability to clearly define and de-
marcate the boundaries of this justification. In order to restore the
rationales behind this so-called free speech justification, this Article
offers two possible accounts for the scope and meaning of the argu-
ment from dignity.
1. A Minimalist Account
The first account of the argument from dignity relies on a mini-
malist version of human dignity, as it purports to focus solely on the
rights of speakers. It is intended to serve exclusively as a justification
for protecting free speech and not as a justification for restricting it.
Both Kent Greenawalt and Ronald Dworkin articulate similar justifi-
cations, relying on dignity and equality as independent free speech
justifications.
Greenawalt's brief account of dignity (and equality) strikingly re-
sembles an argument presented earlier as part of the argument from
autonomy. According to this view, "suppression [of certain views]
represents a kind of contempt for citizens that is objectionable inde-
pendent of its consequences, '' Ss because it fails to treat citizens equally
and with the dignity they deserve.
Greenawalt also briefly mentions human dignity as stifling a per-
son from expressing her views or beliefs, 9° thereby hurting that per-
son's sense of dignity and self-respect. Yet he concedes that "[a] n ar-
gument based on the value of liberty as an emotional outlet and
means of personal development is not restricted to speech alone."9'
He also fails to recognize that restricting specific speech in particular
circumstances rarely stifles a person from expressing her views in al-
ternative permissible ways, and thus can hardly be said to infringe
92substantially upon the right of self-expression.
Greenawalt himself acknowledges that what he calls the dignity
and equality justification is "closely related" to the recognition of
Greenawalt, Free Speech Justications, supra note 23, at 153; see also KENT GREENAWALT,
SPEECH, CRIME, AND THE USES OF LANGUAGE 27-28, 33-34 (1989) [hereinafter GREENAWALT,
SPEECH, CRIME] (arguing that restraint of free speech is an affront to dignity).89 . ..
See Greenawalt, Free Speech Justifications, supra note 23, at 153 (arguing for freedom of
speech "[a]s a matter of basic human respect").
See id. (arguing that "restrictions of expressions may offend dignity to a greater degree
than most other restrictions").
91 GREENAWALT, SPEECH, CRIME, supra note 88, at 28.
92 See Statman, supra note 85, at 576-77 (arguing that since there are usually alternative ways
to express certain views, the limitation of free speech in certain contexts does not carry catas-
trophic consequences).
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autonomy and rationality."s He also questions whether "concerns
about dignity and equality may seem not to be specially related to
speech but to be arguments, perhaps rather weak ones, in favor of
liberty generally., 94 Nonetheless, although Greenawalt raises some of
the difficulties in recognizing dignity as an independent free speech
justification, he fails to persuade as to why dignity should be consid-
ered as a justification, as well as to explain how exactly this justifica-
tion is sufficiently distinguishable from other free speech justifica-
tions, particularly the argument from autonomy.
It appears that Greenawalt's attempt to present a detailed and dis-
tinguishable taxonomy of free speech justifications goes one step too
far. Greenawalt describes his analysis of free speech justifications as
an attempt to "provide some antidote for confusion and for oversim-
plification, the main disease of legal and philosophical scholarship.,
95
96
This ambitious endeavor suffers from over-complication. There is
no real merit in distinguishing the argument from dignity from the
argument from autonomy, even if one attempts thoroughly to dissect
and distinguish the different free speech justifications.
Although Greenawalt refrains from referring to any specific theo-
rist who endorses the arguments from dignity and equality, one may. . .. -- • 97 • ,
assume he is primarily referring to Ronald Dworkin. Dworkin's
works emphasize an account of a dignity-based free speech justifica-
tion that is parallel to Greenawalt's account. For the sake of a fair
analysis of Dworkin's view of dignity and equality as free speech justi-
fications, it is important to relate this view to the broader context of
his works. Dworkin, probably the most esteemed legal philosopher
alive, generally uses the values of equality and dignity as the primary
basis for a moral reading of the American Constitution. 98 Although
93 See Greenawalt, Free Speech Justifications, supra note 23, at 152 (comparing the dignity and
equality justification to the limits that rational, autonomous persons might want to put on gov-
ernment action).
94 Id. at 153.
95 Id. at 119.
96 Cf Brison, supra note 22, at 313 (describing Robert Post's simplifying observation that
many free speech justifications are ultimately based on the ideal of autonomy (citing Robert C.
Post, Managing Deliberation: The Quandary of Democratic Dialogue, 103 ETHICS 654, 666 (1993))).
In Greenawalt's brief account of the dignity and equality justifications, he does not offer
even one footnote to support his analysis nor reference other scholars who hold this view. See
Greenawalt, Free Speech Justifications, supra note 23, at 152-53 (refraining from offering support
in the discussion of the argument from dignity and equality).
98 See, e.g., DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY, supra note 2, at 272-78 (arguing that "gov-
ernment must treat people ... with equal concern and respect"). For criticism of Dworkin's
views on the moral reading of the Constitution, see, for example, Catharine A. MacKinnon,
"Freedom from Unreal Loyalties": On Fidelity in Constitutional Interpretation, 65 FORDHAM L. REV.
1773, 1773 (1997), which attempts to provide an alternative reading of the Constitution that is,
like Dworkin's, "centered on the equality question, but more descriptively accurate of constitu-
tional process and less elitist and exclusionary in method and content." Id.
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his writings over the years have offered more than one version of jus-
tifications for rights in general and free speech in particular,99 it is fair
to say that he views dignity and equality as the primary moral justifica-
tions for rights.
Dworkin's free speech justification that relies on dignity and
equality is, in fact, a version of an autonomy justification (or of a gen-
eral non-discrimination justification). Dworkin views all kinds of
speech as protected under this justification, not only political
speech.00 Thus, his argument for the protection of free speech im-
plies a principled objection towards the limitation of any kind of
speech. This is a nonconsequentialist justification (or, in Dworkin's
words, a "constitutive justification"10 ) that exists side-by-side with the
instrumental justifications to free speech (such as the truth and de-
mocracy arguments) .
Dworkin believes that the government cannot discriminate among
citizens by permitting some views and denying other views. Such
conduct is discriminatory not only to the speaker but also to the soci-
ety as a whole (or potential individual listeners).' °3 The paternalism
applied by government when censoring certain opinions prevents the
citizenry from exercising autonomy and choosing from all available
views, including those that the government dislikes or finds distaste-
ful or dangerous. As Dworkin puts it, " [w] e retain our dignity, as in-
dividuals, only by insisting that no one-no official and no majority-
has the right to withhold opinion from us on the ground that we are
not fit to hear and consider it.'' 0 4 In other places, Dworkin empha-
sizes the egalitarian role of the First Amendment by saying that "First
Cf Brison, supra note 22, at 324-25 (describing two different speech justifications based
on Dworkin's work). Dworkin's writings on these issues spread over several decades and
evolved over time. The portrayal I focus on relates to his later works, in which the focus on dig-
nity and equality is more evident and fully developed.
0 Compare DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY, supra note 2, at 195-213 (arguing for broad
free speech protection using dignity as a justification), with SCHAUER, PHILOSOPHICAL ENQUIRY,
supra note 23, at 65 (claiming that a restriction of political speech that limits the ability to mean-
ingfully participate in the political process harms equality, and would be more appropriately
categorized under the argument from democracy).
Dworkin, The Coming Battles over Free Speech, supra note 78, passim.
102 See DWORKIN, FREEDOM'S LAW, supra note 2, at 209.
103 Id. at 200.
104 Dworkin, The Coming Battles over Free Speech, supra note 78, at 57; see also Ronald Dworkin,
Women and Pornography, N.Y. REV. BOOKS, Oct. 21, 1993, at 36, 41 ("Only one answer is consis-
tent with the ideals of political equality: that no one may be prevented from influencing the
shared moral environment, through his own private choices, tastes, opinions, and example, just
because these tastes or opinions disgust those who have the power to shut him up or lock him
up." (reviewing CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, ONLYWORDS (1993))).
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Amendment liberty is not equality's enemy, but the other side of
equality's coin.
Although Dworkin's powerful writing is thought-provoking, it is
hard to distinguish, for example, Dworkin's earlier accounts of the
justification of free speech protection as a negative right from newer
accounts of dignity and equality. It seems as if Dworkin is simply
trying to rearticulate these two leading values as more appropriate
justifications for free speech than autonomy or liberty concerns. In
any case, he fails to articulate why it is doctrinally correct to view
these issues through the lens of dignity rather than autonomy, and
why dignity concerns should always work in favor of the speaker, even
when they infringe upon others' dignity.
1 0 7
The question is whether one can develop a free speech theory that
is based in a particular conception of what human dignity entails and
whether the contours one chooses will be upheld by others. The em-
ployment of human dignity as a touchstone for doctrine on speech is
problematic if its base is manipulable. As shown below, since a hu-
man-dignity-based regime may be more prone to suppress speech, the
mere use of human dignity as a free speech justification is a cause for
concern.
As discussed below, the minimalist account of the argument from
dignity is compatible with American understandings of rights and of
human dignity. Therefore, it is not surprising that it was articulated
in the above manner by American scholars. In addition, the minimal-
ist account for the argument from dignity is actually not distinct
enough to justify separating it from the argument from autonomy.
2. An Expansive Account
A broader view of the possible relationship between human dig-
nity and freedom of expression attributes more meaning to human
dignity and acknowledges the potential for conflict between the
two-a conflict that the first account disregards. The principal
scholar who points out the problematic theoretical nexus between
dignity and speech is Fredrick Schauer.
105 DWORKIN, FREEDOM'S LAW, supra note 2, at 238. Dworkin also claims that "equality de-
mands that everyone, no matter how eccentric or despicable, have a chance to influence poli-
cies as well as elections," and that "[e]quality demands that everyone's opinion be given a
chance for influence, not that anyone's opinion will triumph or even be represented in what
government eventually does." Id. at 237.
106 See, e.g., Ronald Dworkin, Liberty and Pornography, N.Y. REV. BOOKS, Aug. 15, 1991, at 12
(describing free speech as a negative liberty).107 Cf Greenawalt, Free Speech Justifications, supra note 23, at 151 (asking why government pro-
tects speech promoting irrational actions, rather than protecting the victims of those actions);
SCHAUER, PHILOSOPHICAL ENQUIRY, supra note 23, at 60-66 (considering free speech in terms of
the dignity of the speaker and the recipient).
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Schauer questions the merits of using human dignity as a founda-
tion for the protection of speech and raises several objections to this
approach. His most important contribution questions the implicit
premise behind the minimalist account that human dignity serves
only as a justification for protection of speech. He demonstrates how
some accounts of human dignity can serve as rationales for restricting
speech, and he therefore questions the suitability of human dignity as
a free speech justification. ms
From a theoretical standpoint, it is hard to see how human dignity
can cover all types of speech when it patently stands at odds with some
types of speech. Human dignity is most effective and relevant for
protecting self-regarding speech. "But if this is the case, then the
argument from dignity is not an argument for protecting speech sim-
pliciter, or even an argument for protecting the kind of speech now
commonly protected [in the United States], but is rather an argu-
ment only for protecting substantially self-regarding speech."'10
A focus on dignity as a free speech justification falls short of satis-
factorily covering many kinds of speech. Unlike the arguments from
truth and democracy, which clearly relate directly to free speech, it is
unclear what work is being done by the "dignity" component of the
free speech equation. It seems that human dignity is generally appli-
cable to nonspeech settings,"' since the "[p]rotection of dignity as
protection of self-regarding choice would protect self-regarding
108 See generally Schauer, Speaking of Dignity, supra note 85.
109 Id. at 189 ("The use of a dignity-based conception of protecting choice as a way of protect-
ing speech thus hinges on the assumption that the decision to speak is either in general or in
particular cases not a choice that will infringe on the rights or the dignity of others. But we
have seen that the assumption that speech in general cannot and does not infringe on the dig-
nity or the rights of others is untrue. Consequently, it must be only some linguistic and pictorial
acts that would be protected under this conception of freedom of speech as instantiating a
choice-based protection of dignity."). "Self-regarding speech," is a term used by Schauer to de-
scribe speech that has no potential of conflicting with the dignity of others. See, e.g., SCHAUER,
PHILOSOPHICAL ENQUIRY, supra note 23, at 64. Speech that is aimed solely at ourselves (or that
regards solely ourselves) falls within this category, since it does not have the potential of harm-
inq1the dignity of others. Id.
Schauer, Speaking of Dignity, supra note 85, at 189. This view is compatible with Justice
Dorner's dicta in Golan v. Penitentiary Service, CA 4463/94 Golan v. Penitentiary Service [1996]
IsrSC 50(5) 136, as well as her article on the subject. Dalia Dorner, The Constitutional Protection
of Human Dignity, in HUMAN DIGNITY OR ITS DEGRADATION? THE TENSION OF HUMAN DIGNITY IN
ISRAEL 16, 23-25 (Aluf Hareven & Hen Baram eds., 2000). Justice Dorner argues that there is
special significance to self-regarding speech, such as artistic speech that relates to human dig-
ni Dworkin's writings also apply a similar rationale in other settings, such as private homo-
sexuality, contraception and pornography. See DwORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY, supra note
2, at 275-76 (arguing that the public's moral disapproval should not necessarily burden those
in the minority); cf SCHAUER, PHILOSOPHICAL ENQUIRY, supra note 23, at 65 (responding to
Dworkin's argument).
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choices, whether linguistic or not."'1 2 It is apparent, therefore, that
"trying to tailor a speech-protective conception of dignity as choice to
the need to avoid protecting harmful choices leads to a dropping of
speech qua speech from the analysis."
'" 3
Human dignity and freedom of expression do not share a com-
mon grounding in their theoretical justifications. While freedom of
expression has several classical justifications, just some of them over-
lap with human dignity rationales." 4 The "democratic" and "truth"
arguments that stand at the base of freedom of expression, and that
normally receive the highest level of constitutional protection, are
not covered by the blanket of human dignity."5 The terrain that the
human-dignity blanket covers is limited; it does not even cover some
core expression, such as political speech. Thus, because of its forma-
tive role in self-conception, artistic speech may receive greater protec-
tion than political speech under human dignity rationales, deviating
from the current paradigm under which political speech receives the
highest protection.
Although human dignity and freedom of expression are not nec-
essarily contradictory, and in some cases may even be compatible, it
would be wrong to assume that the two are always compatible and
should be analyzed through the seemingly unifying lens of human
dignity. Framing freedom of expression in terms of human dignity
reduces freedom of expression from its existing parameters accord-
ing to current predominant free speech understandings." 7 In addi-
tion, human dignity is problematic as a supplemental free speech jus-
tification because its expansive account conflicts with speech
protected under other justifications. In these cases, human dignity-
a purported free speech justification-would serve as a reason for
limiting speech, and this result is unacceptable. No other free speech
justification serves as a reason to restrict speech, and any 'justifica-
" Schauer, Speaking of Dignity, supra note 85, at 189.
II3 Id.
'4 See supra Part II.A.
115 See, e.g., WILLIAM W. VAN ALSTYNE, THE AMERICAN FIRST AMENDMENT IN THE TWENTY-FIRST
CENTURY 23 (3d ed. 2002) (depicting the centrality of political advocacy to First Amendment
jurisprudence).
See infra notes 119-22 and accompanying text.
117 If the principle of freedom of speech is not the instantiation of a more general
principle of dignity, then it should not be surprising that the two will frequently
diverge in extension, with freedom of speech often producing deprivations of
dignity, and the desire to promote dignity often suggesting restrictions on
speech. If this is so, then resolving many hard issues by reference to dignity will
be question-begging, and consequently it may be necessary at times to consider
directly which of the values of free speech and dignity is more important.
Schauer, Speaking ofDignity, supra note 85, at 179 (discussing free speech justifications).
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tion" that may have this effect should not be considered as an inde-
pendent free speech justification.
Obviously, not every limitation on freedom of expression involves
harm to human dignity. Regulation of commercial speech, for ex-
ample, "can hardly be seen as violations of the human dignity of the
commercial enterprise."" 8 But when a free speech limitation "relates
to the essence of the individual's rights to express ... herself it in-
volves degrading treatment that violates human dignity."" 9  The
paradigmatic cases in which human dignity and freedom of expres-
sion conflict involve what we may refer to as problematic speech, such
as hate speech, libel and pornography.2 ° In these cases, speech is
used to deprive individuals or group members of human dignity121
based on considerations of race or gender. In applying these con-
cepts to hate speech, it may seem more appropriate to apply auton-
omy as self-fulfillment and human dignity to the victims of the speech
rather than the racist speakers.'
In fact, the expansive account of the argument for dignity gives a
consequentialist twist to Dworkin's and Greenawalt's nonconsequen-
tialist formulations. It challenges the premise that dignity can serve
as a categorical justification for protecting speech without ever look-
ing at the consequences of that speech and its possible infringements
on the dignity of others. Because the expansive account has conse-
quentialist traits, it is no longer immune to balancing 23 and may lead
to speech restriction.
B. Dignity or Autonomy? Avoiding Term Confusion
As shown above, the distinction between autonomy and human
dignity is sometimes unclear. This primarily stems from the ambigu-
ity surrounding human dignity:
118 Kretzmer, supra note 3, at 174. Even under First Amendment doctrines, commercial
speech is considered to be low value speech that is subjected to heightened regulation. See, e.g.,
VAN ALSTYNE, supra note 115, at 637.119
Kretzmer, supra note 3, at 174 (citingJustice Dorner's holding in CrimA 4463/94 Golan v.
The Penitentiary Service [1996] IsrSC 50(5) 136).
120 See supra note 47 (defining "problematic speech").
121 See Brison, supra note 22, at 314 (classifying most pornography as hate speech); Matsuda,
supra note 34, at 2323 (arguing that hate speech "has the effect of perpetuating racism"); Stat-
man, supra note 85, at 577 (arguing that speech is often used to silence minorities, including
women).
122 See Statman, supra note 85, at 577 (arguing that using dignity to protect the vilified sounds
more natural than applying it to the vilifier); cf Giovanni Bognetti, The Concept of Human Dignity
in European and US Constitutionalism, in EUROPEAN AND US CONSTITUTIONALISM, supra note 1, at
85, 91 ("In contrast, in private law the appeal to the dignity of the individual is frequently made
in order to justify restrictions of the private rights of others.").
123 See, e.g., Brison, supra note 22, at 338-39 (calling for balancing the harms of censoring
speech against the harms of allowing hate speech).
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The truth is that, so far, there has been no systematic re-elaboration
of the concept of human dignity which has been able to command if not
universal, then at least widespread, acceptance. Human dignity has been
used to express underlying philosophical beliefs of quite different kinds
for the purpose of reinforcing them with its powerful appeal.
1 24
But autonomy is also partly to blame, as it is frequently used as a
synonym for dignity. For example, Kant uses autonomy and dignity
interchangeably in his writings, where autonomy is meant to preserve• 125
human dignity. Yet autonomy and dignity are in fact different con-
cepts.
126
Autonomy is mostly seen in the United States as focusing on the
rights of the individual speaker.2 7  As Wells rightly notes,
"[a]utonomy in this sense translates into individual freedom from
government interference. Moreover, once conceived as a negative
liberty, autonomy becomes closely associated with speakers; as the
debate is framed, autonomy in the Court's free speech jurisprudence
means freedom of the speaker to say whatever she wants.' 8 This is
what I call dignity in its "narrow sense," and what Wells calls a "mea-
ger conception" of autonomy.
129
In contrast, dignity generally presupposes a broader meaning for
autonomy that entails a communitarian base and that legitimizes, and
even requires, restrictions on free speech.2 This is primarily true re-
garding the Kantian concepts of autonomy and dignity, because Kant-
ian ethics tend to conflate autonomy and dignity,13 giving them a
communitarian twist.
124 Bognetti, supra note 122, at 90.
125 Cf Christina E. Wells, Reinvigorating Autonomy: Freedom and Responsibility in the Supreme
Court's First AmendmentJurisprudence, 32 HARv. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 159, 165 n.30 (1997) (explaining
the concepts of autonomy and dignity in Kantian philosophy).
26 Cf Robert C. Post, Three Concepts of Privacy, 89 CEO. L.J. 2087, 2092 (2001) ("Unlike
autonomy, dignity depends upon intersubjective norms that define the forms of conduct that
constitute respect between persons. That is why modern legal systems so often set autonomy
and dignity in opposition to each other .... 'Autonomy contra dignity, dignity contra auton-
omy, antinomies linked in an uneasy seesaw, with neither tradition totally eliminating what the
other valorizing.'" (quoting PAUL RABINOw, FRENCH DNA: TROUBLE IN PURGATORY 93 (1999))).127 See Wells, supra note 125, at 162-65 (detailing scholarly debate on the subjects of auton-
omy, censorship and the Court).
1 8 Id. at 163.
129 Id. at 195. Wells contrasts the "impoverished concept of autonomy" with a "richer, Kant-
ian notion of autonomy." Id. at 193-95. This is also why I claim that dignity in its narrow sense
is not sufficiently distinguishable from the argument from autonomy.
M Cf id. at 167 (analyzing Kantian notions of governmental authority to limit an individual's
rights only when those rights infringe on the rights of others).
See id. at 167 n.30 (discussing interchangeability of freedom, dignity and autonomy in
Kantian analysis).
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Although human dignity is sometimes used as a synonym for
autonomy, and vice versa, the core meaning of each term is quite
clear. Thus, for example, Brison reviews six different meanings for
the argument from autonomy, but only one of them favors speech
regulation.1 3 4 Brison's account, as well as the mainstream American
scholarly perception of autonomy as a free speech justification, dem-
onstrates that at least intuitively, autonomy rarely conflicts with free-
dom of expression.
Similarly, human dignity is a central term in European constitu-
tionalism, where the Kantian-communitarian perception is domi-
nant.135 Issues that relate to autonomy and privacy are viewed by
German law through the prism of human dignity, whereas the same
issues are discussed in the United States as pertaining to the princi-
ples of liberty and due process. 136 This is yet another example of the
same issues being framed as matters of either autonomy or human
dignity. Yet it also demonstrates that, at least on the surface, human
dignity will be used in some legal systems outside the United States,
where the American system would use autonomy. Therefore, in
Europe, human dignity is much more likely to be perceived as con-
flicting with freedom of expression rather than autonomy and, as a
result, may consequently lead to more speech limitation than auton-
137
omy.
Human dignity also serves as a robust constitutional right in Ger-
many and in an increasing number of other Western democracies
such as South Africa and Israel. The constitutional jurisprudence of
these countries includes a well-developed emphasis on human dig-
nity. Normally this focus recognizes and implements Kantian ethics,
which leads to the restriction of speech. In the United States, how-
ever, human dignity is seldom used in free speech discourse, where it
132 See, e.g., Dworkin, Liberty and Pornography, supra note 106 (giving an example of a speech-
protective use of "dignity").
See, e.g., Frank Michelman, Conceptions of Democracy in American Constitutional Argument: The
Case of Pornography Regulation, 56 TENN. L. REv 291, 307 (1989) (using autonomy as a justifica-
tion to restrict freedom of expression); Wells, supra note 125, at 165 n.30 (referring to Kant's
use of human dignity and autonomy).
134 Brison, supra note 22, at 336-39.
135 See generally EBERLE, supra note 27; KOMMERS, supra note 3.
136 See EBERLE, supra note 27, at 127-33 (contrasting German and American autonomy law);
see also id. at 127 ("German autonomy law.., is animated by dignity, the core principle of the
German legal order, not [by] privacy.").
137 Cf Susan Baer, Dignity or Equality? Responses to Workplace Harassment in European, German,
and U.S. Law, in DIRECTIONS IN SEXUAL HARASSMENT 582 (Catharine MacKinnon & Reva Siegal
eds., 2004) (demonstrating how sexual harassment is perceived in Europe as an infringement
on women's dignity, whereas in the United States, it is viewed as infringement on women's
equality).
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usually holds different (autonomy-related) meanings than in most
other legal systems.
The common interpretation of human dignity is closer to the
Kantian perception of autonomy and dignity. It is clear, however,
that Dworkin rejects the Kantian perception of autonomy with regard
to free speech. Therefore, if Dworkin uses dignity to describe what is
actually a libertarian perception of autonomy, term conflation is
more likely to occur. Therefore, Dworkin's choice of words is some-
what puzzling. 13 For these reasons, it is strategically wrong to use hu-
man dignity as a free speech justification, especially when autonomy
adequately serves the same purpose.
An example for the use of autonomy as both a justification for
free speech and its restriction can be found in Joseph Raz's work.
139
Raz renders an interesting perspective regarding the role of auton-
omy as a justification for free speech in his articulation of the nexus
between free expression, pluralism and autonomy. Autonomy, ac-
cording to Raz, entails choice. Choice is facilitated by diversity, since
only the existence (and the awareness) of real alternatives gives
autonomy its true meaning. A lack of different options therefore
hinders autonomous choice. Therefore, Raz views the portrayal of
different lifestyles by the media as an important societal tool for le-
gitimacy and validation of different groups in Western societies.
140
Thus, he believes that people "depend on finding themselves re-
flected in the public media for a sense of their own legitimacy, for a
feeling that their problems and experiences are not freak devia-
tions.
Much like Dworkin, Raz views censorship as an insult the govern-
ment imposes on its citizens, and also views the exposure of citizens
to many views and lifestyles as important. 42 Yet, unlike Dworkin, Raz
believes that not all "bad speech" deserves protection. 4 3 Thus, an ar-
138 As mentioned earlier, Dworkin likely chose to use human dignity when articulating this
argument due to his use of human dignity throughout his writings as a central justification for
rights in general. He probably did not foresee the possible negative implications of using hu-
man dignity in this context. Both Dworkin and I share the same passions, and I know how right
he is about his general approach towards freedom of speech. What I am doubting is that he is
right to summon dignity (and equality) in defense of free speech. Cf. Frank I. Michelman, Must
a Constitutional Democracy Be "Responsive"?, 107 ETHICS 706, 723 (1994) (agreeing with Robert
Post's approach regarding the importance of free speech protection, but doubting whether his
use of "democracy" as ajustification for speech protection is warranted).
139 Joseph Raz, Free Expression and Personal Identification, 11 OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD. 303
(1991).
140 Id. at 309-10.
'41 Id. at 312.
142 Id.
143 Raz does not specify what speech ought not receive protection; instead, he leaves the issue
somewhat vague. He suggests that speech that is illegal should enter this category, yet some
speech may be legal in some countries and illegal in others (such as is the case of hate speech in
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gument that is similar in nature to Dworkin's articulation of the ar-
gument from dignity yields speech-restricting results.
Raz's viewpoint is more compatible with European conceptions of
rights that promote balancing of free speech with other rights. Raz
uses rationales similar to Dworkin's yet renders opposite results. He
demonstrates that, without a First Amendment framework, an em-
phasis on dignity (and even autonomy) works against freedom of ex-
pression.
Therefore, term conflation is best avoided by referring to auton-
omy when protecting speech and to dignity when restricting it. This
understanding of autonomy and dignity is compatible with the com-
mon understandings and interpretations of the two. It will result in a
better theoretical discourse, since in the current debates, quite often
dignity is referred to as autonomy, and vice versa. Theoretical clarity
will be easily reached by this suggestion, avoiding the danger of con-
fusion this Article warns against.
C. The Relevance of Human Dignity from a Comparative Perspective
1. The Two Accounts from a Comparative Perspective
The two accounts offered above for the argument from dignity are
parallel to comparative understandings of what human dignity is,
both in general and in relation to freedom of expression in particu-
lar. The minimalist account characterizes the American approach,
whereas the expansive account characterizes the approach of most
other Western democracies to these issues. Thus intuitively, for an
American, human dignity may seem like a justification for protecting
speech whereas for a European, human dignity may seem like ajusti-
fication for limiting it.
In the American system, the debate concerning the nature of the
nexus between human dignity and freedom of expression may seem
insignificant. Indeed, although some scholars and jurists argue that
human dignity is a central value in American constitutional jurispru-
dence,144 it does not arise as a prominent or central value under
common American legal understanding, and it is certainly not a rec-
ognized right.4- In addition, as discussed above, the arguments from
Europe and the United States). Cf id. at 319 (describing why not all bad speech is protected,
and giving examples).
144 See, e.g., RONALD DWORKIN, FREEDOM'S LAw, supra note 2, at 1-38 (arguing that the
clauses of the American Constitution embody abstract moral principles, including human dig-
nity); see also Murphy, supra note 2 (offering a comparative analysis of the fundamental values
enshrined in different constitutions).
15 See generally THE CONSTITUTION OF RIGHTS, supra note 85 (collecting several perspectives
on the intersection between human dignity and American constitutional interpretation); Paust,
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autonomy and human dignity are more influential abroad than in the
United States, especially in relation to nonpolitical speech. 46 There-
fore, the effect of human dignity on freedom of expression in the
United States cannot be far-reaching. This is also true due to the
rule-based First Amendment jurisprudence that serves as a "buffer"
against "irrelevant considerations" affecting its contours and con-
tent. 147 The minimalist account is also compatible with current First
Amendment jurisprudence and with key doctrines like content neu-
trality, which is unique to the American setting. Also, more general
constitutional doctrines, such as the Fourteenth Amendment's focus
on discriminatory intent rather than disparate impact,14 reflect dif-
ferences between the United States and other countries in the appli-
cation of human dignity. Nonetheless, the effects of human dignity
on freedom of expression in other constitutional settings may reach
further.
Human dignity is a central right and a leading value in many
Western constitutional regimes, especially those formed in the sec-
ond half of the twentieth century. 49 In some cases, the right to hu-
man dignity is at the focal point of national constitutional schemes.
15°
These systems are also characterized by non-rule-based free expres-
sion jurisprudence, which makes them more susceptible to having the
supra note 2, at 146-84 (noting that despite a trend towards invoking human dignity concepts
more often, the Supreme Court's references to human dignity have been, at best, scattered). It
is noteworthy that some state constitutions explicitly enumerate human dignity as a right. See,
e.g., MONT. CONST. art. II, § 4 ("The dignity of the human being is inviolable."). But the Fed-
eral Constitution prevails when it comes to freedom of expression, so the likelihood that state
courts would balance human dignity and freedom of expression as rights is minuscule. See Mat-
thew 0. Clifford & Thomas P. Huff, Some Thoughts on the Meaning and Scope of the Montana Consti-
tution's "Dignity" Clause with Possible Applications, 61 MONT. L. REv. 301, 301-02 (2000) (contend-
ing that, at present, the Montana Supreme Court has not yet found substantive meaning in
Montana's dignity clause); see also Heinz Klug, The Dignity Clause of the Montana Constitution, 64
MONT. L. REV. 133, 133-34 (2003) (arguing for development of Montana's dignity clause, given
its current dormancy).
146 See, e.g., supra notes 61-70 and accompanying text.
147 Cf GREENAWALT, FIGHTING WORDS, supra note 25, at 151 (arguing that Canadians are less
restrained than Americans in their free speech adjudication, because they lack "the baggage of
much prior adjudication"); Schauer, Freedom of Expression Adjudication, supra note 4, at 54-56
(noting the rigid and rule-bound nature of American speech doctrine as compared to doctrines
in other countries).
148 Compare Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003) (applying strict scrutiny to an intention-
ally discriminatory affirmative action program), with Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 242
(1976) (noting "[d]isproportionate impact .... [s]tanding alone ... does not trigger the rule
that racial classifications are to be subjected to the strictest scrutiny and are justifiable only by
the weightiest of considerations" (citation omitted)).
149 See, e.g., Eckart Klein & David Kretzmer, Foreword to THE CONCEPT OF HUMAN DIGNITY IN
HUMAN RIGHTS DISCOURSE, supra note 1, at v, v-vii (describing the role of human dignity in sev-
eral legal regimes).
150 Germany is a good example of such a system. See generally EBERLE, supra note 27, at 41-45
(describing human dignity's role in the Basic Law of the Federal Republic of Germany).
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irrelevant considerations of human dignity balanced into their free
expression doctrines. 15  In addition, as discussed below, most other
Western democracies hold different constitutional ideals than the
United States does regarding enforcing community values and morals
in speech regulation, framing free speech as a positive right, and rec-
ognizing the rights of the audience. These differences may lead
those legal systems to adopt an expansive account of dignity and,
therefore, be more prone to limit free speech due to dignity concerns
than to protect it. In any case, in most Western democracies the de-
bate about the interrelationship between human dignity and freedom
of expression is far more substantial than it is in the United States
and carries greater consequences.
German constitutional jurisprudence gives human dignity prece-
dence over all other rights and interests, including free speech. The
Federal Constitutional Court of Germany has developed a well-
established body of law that reflects this priority. Thus, although
freedom of speech is enumerated in Article 5 of the Basic Law of the
Federal Republic of Germany, it is subordinate to the human dignity
guarantee of Article 1. As the German Court put it, human dignity is
"the supreme value [that] dominates the whole value system of fun-
damental rights.' '5 2 The German approach to freedom of speech ap-
plies even when core political speech is involved and creates an im-
balanced, speech-restrictive legal regime.
53
Although Germany offers an extreme model for balancing human
dignity and freedom of expression, most other Western democracies
are closer to the German model than to America's robust free speech
protection. Many, such as South Africa and Israel, have human dig-
nity clauses in their constitutional documents, which receive great
importance in their constitutional schemes. 54 Even countries that do
151 Cf Schauer, Freedom of Expression Adjudication, supra note 4, at 49-51 (arguing that Euro-
pean free speech adjudication is characterized by balancing).
152 Mephisto, BVerfGE 30, 173 (1971) (F.R.G.), translated in 2 DECISIONS OF THE
BUNDESVERFASSUNGSGERICHT-FEDERAL CONSTITUTIONAL COURT-FEDERAL REPUBLIC (1958)
OF GERMAN' (pt. 1), at 156 (1998); see also RonaldJ. Krotoszynski,Jr., A Comparative Perspective on
the First Amendment: Free Speech, Militant Democracy, and the Primacy of Dignity as a Preferred Constitu-
tional Value in Germany, 78 TUL. L. REv. 1549, 1562-63 (2004) (noting that, in Germany, other
values, such as freedom of speech, are subordinate to human dignity).
153 See, e.g., Staubeta Caricature, BVerfGE 75, 369 (1987) (F.R.G.), translated in 2 DECISIONS
OF THE BUNDESVERFASSUNGSGERICHT-FEDERAL CONSTITUTIONAL COURT-FEDERAL REPUBLIC
(1958) OF GERMANY (pt. 2), at 420, 420-21 (1998) (protecting politicians from harsh parody
that portrays them as animals).
154 See S. AFR. CONST. 1996, ch. 2, § 10 ("Everyone has inherent dignity and the right to have
their dignity respected and protected."); Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty, 1994, S.H. 90
arts. 2, 4 ("There shall be no violation of the life, body or dignity of any person as such.... All
persons are entitled to protection of their life, body and dignity."). Please note that Israel does
not have an enumerated free speech clause. This may lead to a further weakening of free
speech vis-t-vis the enumerated right to human dignity.
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not utilize human dignity as a central constitutional right, such as the
United Kingdom, limit free speech in ways that are compatible with
human-dignity rationales.'55 Therefore, it is more than plausible that
outside the United States, the mere use of human dignity will bring
about speech-restrictive outcomes.
Using human dignity as a free speech justification legitimizes the
discourse in this field and blunts the tension between the two. A
horizontal balancing between freedom of speech and human dignity
is facilitated by this discourse, resulting in yet another danger threat-
ening freedom of expression: the further restriction of speech.
Since human dignity has become such a robust right in some Western
democracies and is so prevalent in the constitutional discourse of
countries such as Germany, Israel, and South Africa, it is not surpris-
ing that many judges in those nations frame freedom of expression
issues in human dignity terms. But few justices have observed that to
prevent speech restriction, human dignity and freedom of expression
should be viewed as conflicting rights. 
56
2. The Extent to Which Human Dignity and Autonomy Concerns Affect
Different Legal Systems-Three Parameters
As mentioned earlier, most Western democracies construe the
nexus between human dignity and freedom of expression such that
they adopt the "expansive account" of human dignity, whereas in the
United States the "minimalist account" may seem more appropriate.
In order to demonstrate why this proposition is correct, I will now set
forth a framework for predicting whether a specific legal system is
more prone to limiting free speech due to human dignity concerns
or to protecting it.
Although several variables may be relevant for this kind of predic-
tion, three are particularly valuable in determining whether a human
dignity focus will result in the limitation or protection of free speech
in a specific legal system. These are: (a) individualism versus com-
munitarianism and paternalism; (b) speaker versus audience focus;
and (c) negative- versus positive-rights perceptions. The combination
of these factors may offer a good predictor of how a specific legal sys-
tem will treat human dignity concerns in its freedom of expression
jurisprudence.
155 See, e.g., Race Relations Act, 1976, c. 74, § 29 (UK) (forbidding publication of advertise-
ments that, inter alia, indicate an individual's intent to engage in an act of discrimination).
156 See Statman, supra note 85 (referring to the Supreme Court rulings both in Israel and
South Africa).
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a. Individualism Versus Communitarianism and Paternalism
Constitutional instincts in the United States are far more libertar-
ian than they are in most Western democracies, especially when First
Amendment doctrine is involved. Thus, America's perception of
autonomy and freedom of speech is very individualistic. 57 Fur in-
stance, the content-neutrality doctrine, which prohibits censorship on
grounds of content, can be explained as a commitment to this kind
of individualism and individual moral responsibility.158 Consequently,
any censorship on grounds of content is inconsistent with America's
libertarian commitment.'
As opposed to America's libertarian origins, European communi-
tarian perceptions of fraternity (fraternite), solidarity, and paternalism
characterize most other Western democracies.10 In such paternalistic
societies, valuing certain thoughts above others is essentially limiting
speech because of its content.
Even when European courts deal with individual rights, they are
usually contextualized within "community surroundings."' 6 ' Differ-
ences between Europe and the United States concerning community
and individualism in the context of free speech are articulated nicely
by Sionaidh Douglas-Scott, who says that:
European case law rejects a conception of individuals as beings who
merely should be left to their own devices to make up their own minds
about the value of expression in the public domain, to be free to ignore
it, or to counter it with more speech. Such an approach isolates human
157 See POST, supra note 12, at 9-10 (noting that an infusion of individualism and autonomy
has transformed people's sense of community identity, shaping American conceptions of free-
dom of speech); Robert C. Post, Cultural Heterogeneity and Law: Pornography, Blasphemy, and the
First Amendment, 76 CAL. L. REv. 297, 297 (1988) (arguing that individualist considerations, not
pluralist ones, shape American First Amendment doctrine); cf Brison, supra note 22, at 313 (ar-
guing that autonomy-based justifications for free speech do not preclude imposing restrictions
on hate speech). Kent Greenawalt, who plays with the themes of individuals and communities
when comparing Canadian and American freedom of expression, states a broader comparative
perspective, according to which "[a]ny country's dominant culture will place more or less em-
phasis on individuals or communities, and this will affect the kind of latitude the political
branches and courts will afford to speech." GREENAWALT, FIGHTING WORDS, supra note 25, at 8-
9.
58 See DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY, supra note 2, at 205 (discussing the relationship
between majority enforcement of rights and respect for the minority).
159 See Dworkin, Liberty and Pornography, supra note 106, at 12-13 (arguing that content-based
regulations are inconsistent with the First Amendment).
o See KOMMERS, supra note 3, at 694 ("Thus, the political system as seen through the eyes of
the Federal Constitutional Court is marked indelibly by fraternity as by liberty and equality.");
see also SCHAUER, PHILOSOPHICAL ENQUIRY, supra note 23, at 65 ("Many countries recognize a
strong Free Speech Principle but regulate [speech] on the basis of moral and paternalistic prin-
ciples."); Brugger, Communitarianism, supra note 36, at 433 (arguing that communitarian values
have a role in the interpretation of the German Constitution).
161 KOMMERS, supra note 3, at 694 ("In the German view, human dignity can exist only when
persons are allowed to develop themselves as rational beings in community with others.").
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beings by forcing them to take the consequences of painful conduct and
ignores the particular susceptibility of certain groups to injury, especially
when the offense of the speech seems to be targeted at such groups be-
cause of their identity. Under the American model, the individual will be
left to his or her less communal and somewhat atomistic existence.
1 62
These differences have many reasons. Most European countries
have more homogeneous societies than the United States does, mak-
ing societal common ground seemingly easier to define and reach.
The law in these countries is meant to facilitate maintaining this col-
lective identi %, even at the expense of regulating certain speech due
to its content.1
In addition, the European experience during World War II was a
formative experience not only for Germany, but for the Continent as
a whole. Though the United States does not have a positive history
when it comes to racial relations (for example, slavery, the Civil War
and Jim Crow), American democracy never produced a totalitarian
regime as some European countries did, nor did it experience the
traumatic reaction Europe shared from the War. One of the reac-
tions to these experiences was the adoption of human dignity as a
leading constitutional value.
164
The restriction of some problematic speech, especially group libel
and hate speech, may be justified from a communitarian viewpoint.
A restriction of such speech is desirable "not only in order to protect
certain groups but for the well-being of the society as a whole.',1
65
Maintaining a minimum of civility in public discourse may be viewed
as the ultimate goal of such restrictions since permitting vilification
harms the society as a whole. 66 The legal basis that legitimizes these
restrictions "can be found in the central constitutional principles of
equality, human dignity and non-discrimination.',
6 7
162 Sionaidh Douglas-Scott, The Hatefulness of Protected Speech: A Comparison of the American and
European Approaches, 7 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 305, 343 (1999).
161 See, e.g., KOMMERS, supra note 3, at 695 ("In Germany, however, speech is juridically valued
for its capacity to create community. The German view holds that free speech requires persons
participating in the forum of public discussion to speak the truth and to do so with respect for
other persons' personal honor and dignity. In short, the purpose of political discourse in Ger-
man theory is to create a tradition of civility and a polity of responsible citizens.").
164 See, e.g., Klein & Kretzmer, supra note 149, at v-vi (discussing the increased prominence of
human dignity in both international covenants and modern constitutions).
165 Errera, supra note 5, at 37. Slight exceptions may be seen in the United States in specific
contexts, such as cross burning, seeVirginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343 (2003), possibly anti-abortion
speech, see Hill v. Colorado, 530 U.S. 703, 742 (2000) (Scalia, J., dissenting), and gays and lesbi-
ans in the Boy Scouts, see Boy Scouts of Am. v. Dale, 530 U.S. 640, 661 (2000). See generally
O'Neil, supra note 31, at 29-30 (commenting on various examples of the Supreme Court's hate
speech jurisprudence, including Dale).
1 66 See Errera, supra note 5, at 37 (discussing the ills of group libel and hate speech).
167 Id. (emphasis added).
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European sensitivity regarding racist speech has not been applied,
so far, to speech that some say impinges upon gender equality (for
example, pornography). Canada is the only Western democracy so
far that has seriously attempted to restrict pornography due to com-
munitarian concerns that relate to dignity and equality.' 6 Nonethe-
less, Europeans are more susceptible to such a possible restriction
169than Americans are.
Therefore, while autonomy focuses on the individual in the
American context, it tends to be an argument that protects all
speech. 70  Contrary to the American emphasis on individualism, the
communitarian conceptualization of autonomy and rights in other
Western democracies may well lead to autonomy and dignity con-
cerns being used to limit speech.
b. Speaker Focus Versus Audience Focus
In addition to or, in fact, as a result of the different emphases on
individual and communitarian perceptions of rights in the United
States and Europe, there are also different emphases on the holders
of rights in those societies. In the American system, many leading
commentators put an emphasis on the rights of the speaker, and the
potential harm to members of the audience is usually categorized as
infringement on their interests rather than their rights."7'
168 See, e.g., R. v. Butler, [1992] S.C.R. 452, 479 (Can.) ("This type of material would, appar-
ently, fail the community standards test not because it offends against morals but because it is
perceived by public opinion to be harmful to society, particularly to women. While the accu-
racy of this perception is not susceptible of exact proof, there is a substantial body of opinion
that holds that the portrayal of persons being subjected to degrading or dehumanizing sexual
treatment results in harm, particularly to women and therefore to society as a whole.").
H9 See, e.g., HCJ 5432/03 Shin v. The Cable & Satellite Council [2004] IsrSC 58(3) 65; HCJ
4804/94 Station Film Co. v. The Film Review Bd. [1997] IsrSC 50(5) 661, 1 11, translation avail-
able at http://elyonl.court.gov.il/files-eng/94/040/048/zOl/94048040.zOl.htm (commenting
on the treatment of pornography in Israeli jurisprudence).
170 See, e.g., Michel Rosenfeld, Hate Speech in ConstitutionalJurisprudence: A Comparative Analy-
sis, 24 CARDOZO L. REV. 1523, 1535 (2003) ("As originally conceived, the justification from
autonomy seemed exclusively concerned with the self-expression needs of speakers.... Under a
less individualistic-or at least less atomistic--conception of autonomy and self-respect, how-
ever, focusing exclusively on the standpoint of the speaker would seem insufficient.").
171 See Brison, supra note 22, at 316-17 (critiquing Ronald Dworkin's position that "restric-
tions on hate speech would violate individuals' right to autonomy" (footnote omitted)); Ronald
Dworkin, The Rights of Myron Farber, N.Y. REV. BOOKS, Oct. 26, 1978 (distinguishing between First
Amendment claims based on principle, which require vindication of moral rights, from claims
based on policy, which require a balancing of interests and must yield to claims of principle
when the two conflict); Frederick F. Schauer, The Rights of M.A. Farber: An Exchange, N.Y. REV.
BooKS, Dec. 7, 1978, at 39 ("If the only free speech claims that can under Professor Dworkin's
analysis prevail automatically over considerations of policy are those that are based on the
moral rights of the speaker, then it is hard to see why there is such a strong presumption in fa-
vor of allowing the publication of [sensitive government information].').
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Normally, rights in general, and the right of free speech in par-
ticular, are beneficial to the speaker, not to the audience.17 This clas-
sic perception of rights usually classifies harms to a hypothetical au-
dience that are caused by the fulfillment of a person's speech rights
as societal interests, and balances these interests as inferior to the in-
dividual rights. Without some compelling legal justification, the so-
cietal interests are trumped by the individual rights. 7 3 Therefore, us-
ing human dignity to defend victims of speech (such as in cases of
hate speech or pornography) is arguably a confusion between rights
and interests.
74
The determination of whether a certain violation infringes upon
rights or interests carries great significance. According to the Dwork-
inian perception applied by many Western democracies, only a sub-
stantial harm to an interest may trump a certain right. This balanc-
ing between rights and interests is called vertical balancing, and
interests rarely win this battle. An example of such balancing is the
Clear and Present Danger Test, which balances the right to free
speech with society's interest in security. The test prescribes that the
prior restraint of speech is permissible only when there is actual or
imminent danger, such as violence or injuries to others.175 But if the
harm infringes upon a right, then two rights are conflicting (for ex-
ample, the speaker's right to free speech and the addressee's right to
human dignity). In such a case a horizontal balancing is applied,
with no inherent strength given to either right vis-;I-vis the competing
right.7 6  While in the United States the harms racial and porno-
17 See Michael Dan Birenhak, Constitutional Engineering-The Supreme Court's Methodology in
Value-Based Decisions, 19 MECHKARI MISHPAT 591, 608-12 (2003) (demonstrating how the Israeli
Supreme Court manipulates some interests as rights); cf CrimA 3750/94 Ploni v. Israel [1994]
IsrSC 48(4) 621, 630 (claiming, in the opinion of Chief Justice Shamgar, that human dignity
defends the rights of the victims, and not only the rights of perpetrators).
173 See Ronald M. Dworkin, Rights as Trumps, in THEORIES OF RIGHTS 153, 153-67 (Jeremy
Waldron ed., 1984) (arguing that rights of speakers should trump the desires of the community
maority).
But see DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY, supra note 2, at 198-203 (framing the conflict
between speakers and the victims of their speech as an example of competing rights). Another
possible construction of this conflict is defining these harms as infringing upon group rights.
See, e.g., Evan P. Schultz, Group Rights, American Jews, and the Failure of Group Libel Laws, 1913-
1962, 66 BROOK. L. REV. 71, 75-76 (2000) (summarizing attempts by American Jews to justify
group libel laws based on their rights as a group rather than the rights of the individuals in the
group)
See Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447-48 (1969) ("[Al State [cannot] forbid or pro-
scribe advocacy of the use of force ... except where such advocacy is directed to inciting or
producing imminent lawless action and is likely to incite or produce such action."); Nadine
Strossen, Hate Speech and Pornography, 46 CASE W. RES. L. REv. 449, 455 (1996) ("[A] restriction
on speech can be justified only when necessary to prevent actual or imminent harm, such as
violence or injury to others.").
76 See DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY, supra note 2, at 184-205.
Apr. 2007]
JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
graphic speech may cause are perceived as harms to interests, they
may be perceived in other legal systems as infringement of rights.'77
"[A] rguments from dignity seem much more plausibly to generate
arguments for restricting various kinds of speech than for protecting
it."'78 When a person is vilified because of his race, for example, the
harm to his dignity is quite evident. Yet it is harder to articulate the
harm to the vilifier's own dignity if he is prohibited from saying racial
slurs. It seems more plausible to view human dignity as protecting
the rights of minorities than of racists. A similar example may be
pornography, where many claim that human dignity naturally leads
to protecting the victims of this speech rather than the publishers.1 7 9
As Michel Rosenfeld rightly remarked, the justification from
autonomy "goes hand in hand with a ban against hate speech so long
as the autonomy of speakers and listeners is given equal weight.... If
autonomy is taken as requiring dignity and reciprocity, then it de-
mands banning hate speech as an affront against the basic rights of
its targets." '
The rights discourse in most Western democracies recognizes the
rights of the audience or the victims and reject an exclusive ocus on
the rights of the speaker or perpetrator. Thus, for example, the
rights of victims are balanced vis-A-vis the rights of criminals, and the
rights of speakers are balanced vis-A-vis the rights of addressees. For
instance, the right to human dignity in Germany is interpreted as
protecting the rights of both speakers and addresses."" The Israeli
Supreme Court has also interpreted the right to human dignity as
177 See R. v. Butler, [1992] 1 S.C.R. 452, 455 (Can.) (holding that a statute restricting degrad-
ing or dehumanizing pornography was justified because it protects the community from harm
and promotes the equality of women); HCJ 4804/94 Station Film Co. v. Film Review Bd. [1997]
IsrSC 50(5) 661, translation available at http://elyonl.court.gov.il/fileseng/94/040/048/z01/
94048040.z01.HTM (discussing in dicta the possibility that pornographic expression can be re-
stricted when it is likely to harm the equal status of women); Ploni, lsrSC 48(4) at 630.
178 Schauer, Speaking of Dignity, supra note 85, at 184; see also Statman, supra note 85, at 576-
80.
l, Statman, supra note 85, at 577-78; see also literature on "silencing," such as CENSORSHIP
AND SILENCING (Robert Post ed., 1988) (exploring the various ways speech is restricted from
explicit legal control to regulation through subsidies and property rights and to state interven-
tion in private constraints of expression). The writings of Catharine MacKinnon focus on
equality and human dignity as primary justifications for the restriction of pornography. See, e.g.,
MACKINNON, ONLYWORDS, supra note 67, at 71-110 (arguing that absolute free speech rights
forpornographers undermine the equality of women).
181 Rosenfeld, supra note 170, at 1562.
181 Winfried Brugger, Ban On or Protection of Hate Speech? Some Observations Based on German
and American Law, 17 TUL. EUR. & Civ. L.F. 1, 19 & n.45 (2002).
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applying to victims as well as per petrators.8 1 Canada's pornography
rulings share a similar rationale.
Some of the approach toward recognition of audiences' rights
may also be attributed to the third factor, which relates to the recog-
nition of positive and negative rights.
c. Negative Rights Versus Positive Rights
Whether freedom of expression is construed as a negative right'
84
or as a positive right 88 has a potential effect on the way human dignity
may limit freedom of expression.
The First Amendment is distinctly perceived as protecting a nega-
tive right. The negative perception of rights is characteristic to
American constitutional law, but is probably most evident in First
Amendment doctrines. 186  There are slight exceptions to this rule
such as the Public Forum Doctrine, but by and large, this is a fair
characterization of American free speech law.'8 7  Thus, the courts
have explicated the First Amendment as guaranteeing "the negative
liberty of free speech."'88 Dworkin characterizes this choice of fram-
ing freedom of expression as a negative right as "the core of the
choice modern democracies have made."' 89
82 See Ploni, IsrSC 48(4) at 630 (noting that human dignity defends the ights of the victims,
and not only the rights of the perpetrators, according to ChiefJustice Shamgar).
183 SeeR. v. Butler, [1992] S.C.R. 452, 454 (Can.) (applying the "degrading or dehumanizing
test" for restricting pornography on the basis that it harms the community).
184 Negative liberty can be briefly characterized as "not being obstructed by others in doing
[what] one might wish to do." Dworkin, Liberty and Pornography, supra note 106, at 12.
185 In a nutshell, positive liberty can be characterized as "the power to control or participate
in public decisions, including the decision how far to curtail negative liberty." Id. Dworkin
summarizes the concept of positive liberty by saying that "in an ideal democracy-whatever that
is-the people govern themselves. Each is master to the same degree, and positive liberty is
secured for all." Id. See generally ISAIAH BERLIN, Two Concepts of Liberty, in LIBERTY 166 (Henry
Hardy ed., 2002) (providing elaboration on negative and positive rights).
86 See Brison, supra note 22, at 338-39 (questioning the extreme emphasis on autonomy in
free speech discourse compared to other topics).187For elaboration on the Public Forum Doctrine see, for example, VAN ALSTYNE, supra note
115, at 373-548. California law treats privately-owned shopping centers as quasi-public forums.
The Supreme Court of California has ruled that the California Constitution "protect[s] speech
and petitioning, reasonably exercised, in shopping centers even when the centers are privately
owned." Robins v. Pruneyard Shopping Ctr., 592 P.2d 341, 347 (1979); see also Waremart Foods
v. NLRB, 354 F.3d 870, 872 (D.C. Cir. 2004).
188 Dworkin, Liberty and Pornography, supra note 106, at 13 n.4; see, e.g., Am. Booksellers Ass'n,
Inc. v. Hudnut, 771 F.2d 323, 327 (1985), affd, 475 U.S. 1001 (1986) ("[T]he government must
leave to the people the evaluation of ideas.").
189 Cf Dworkin, Liberty and Pornography, supra note 106, at 15. ("Freedom of speech, con-
ceived and protected as a fundamental negative liberty, is the core of the choice modern de-
mocracies have made, a choice we must now honor in finding our own ways to combat the
shaming inequalities women still suffer.").
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Yet it appears that Dworkin's premise is inaccurate, since most
modern democracies recognize, to certain degrees, some positive-
rights aspects of their free speech doctrines. Germany is the clearest
example of the application of rights as positive rights, including when
it comes to free expression.'" Nonetheless, as in the examples given
earlier, Germany does not stand alone in this trend. It is followed,
usually to a lesser extent, by other Western democracies such as Can-
ada,'9 ' Israel,1
9 2 and France.
9 3
The distinction between the public and private spheres is also af-
fected by positive and negative rights perceptions. Basically, if free-
dom of expression is merely a negative right, the government is not
allowed to censor its citizens. But if rights are construed in a positive
manner, the government can regulate harm that is caused by private
actors. Indeed, some of the debate regarding the restriction of por-
nography revolves around the classification of rights as positive or
negative.
As we can see, the parameters reviewed above align with American
and European free speech perceptions. The United States is clearly
individualistic, speaker-focused and based on negative right. Most
other Western democracies are quite clearly on the opposite side due
to their recognition and application of community values, audience
rights, and positive rights. These differences set the United States
apart from the rest of the Western democracies. This may serve as yet
another explanation for American Exceptionalism and explain why,
in America, human dignity is perceived as having different implica-
tions for free speech than elsewhere.
IV. DRIVING A WEDGE BETWEEN FREEDOM OF SPEECH AND HUMAN
DIGNITY
Speaking of speech in human dignity terms may be a double-
edged sword. As Schauer notes, the "conflation of dignity and
190 See Dieter Grimm, Human Rights and Judicial Review in Germany, in HUMAN RIGHTS AND
JUDIcIAL REVIEW 267, 283 (David Beatty ed., 1994) (referring to the German jurisprudential
perception of the "protective duties" (Schutzpflicht) of government).
See, e.g., Mayo Moran, Talking About Hate Speech: A Rhetorical Analysis of American and Cana-
dian Approaches to the Regulation of Hate Speech, 1994 Wis. L. REV. 1425, 1506 n.271 (noting that
Canadian political culture sees government more positively than American culture).
192 See, e.g., Carmi, supra note 10, at 284-87 (describing the principles of public access that
govern the Israeli press).
193 See, e.g., Eric Barendt, BROADCASTING LAW: A COMPARATIVE STUDY 13-19 (1993) (describ-
ing the evolving role of government in French broadcasting).
See, e.g., Dworkin, Liberty and Pornography, supra note 106, at 14 ("But the most imaginative
feminist literature for censorship makes a further and different argument: that negative liberty
for pornographers conflicts not just with equality but with positive liberty as well, because por-
nography leads to women's political as well as economic or social subordination.").
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speech, as a general proposition, is mistaken, for although speaking is
sometimes a manifestation of the dignity of the speaker, speech is
also often the instrument through use of which the dignity of others
is deprived."1 95 Both freedom of expression and human dignity may
gain by untying this "Gordian knot." From a theoretical perspective,
a construction of conflict rather than unity between these two consti-
tutional concepts 96 is preferable.' 97 As Schauer notes:
To drive a wedge between the principles of dignity and free speech is
not to suggest that dignity is not a primary human good. Nor is it to sug-
gest that free speech, as a constraint on the ability of some agent in con-
trol to limit the communication of some agent under control, is not also
a good thing. But noting that dignity and speech are not necessarily con-
joined leads to the conclusion that the values of free speech and preser-
vation of dignity will often collide. When that is the case, considering the
instances in which an act of speech is an expression of dignity will be of
little assistance. Consequently, thinking seriously about dignity may
cause us either to recognize its irrelevance to free speech theory or to re-
evaluate some of that theory itself.'9
This wedge between the principles of dignity and free speech ex-
ists in the American setting, inter alia, in the form of the rule-based
First Amendmentjurisprudence. 99 It is lacking in most European sys-
tems, which are non-rule-based and deploy constitutional "balancing"
200
in cases that involve freedom of expression.
A prime justification for this wedge is the potential for misapplica-
tion of the term "human dignity." Ronald Dworkin, throughout his
writings, warns of the confusion of terms. For example, he repeatedly
cautions against the conflation of interests, values, and rights.2'
Framing a free speech justification in human dignity terms leads to
such a possible confusion, so the connection between freedom of ex-
... Schauer, Speaking of Dignity, supra note 85, at 179.
196 I deliberately use the term "constitutional concepts," and not rights or values, since, as I
show in this Paper, the term "human dignity" may be regarded as either a right or a value (or
even both), but this determination may vary among different legal systems and different cir-
cumstances, and may carry practical consequences.
197 Cf Statman, supra note 85, at 578-79 (arguing that construing the conflict between hu-
man dignity and freedom of expression in terms of conflicting rights, rather than viewing hu-
man dignity as part of the justification for freedom of expression, offers a clearer conceptualiza-
tion of this tension).
198 Schauer, Speaking of Dignity, supra note 85, at 179.
199 See Schauer, The Exceptional First Amendment, supra note 6, at 53-56 (describing the rule-
based nature of First Amendment jurisprudence in comparison to the European balancing dis-
course).
2W See O'Neil, supra note 31, at 30; Schauer, Freedom of Expression Adjudication, supra note 4, at
49-53.
201 See, e.g., DwoRKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY, supra note 2; cf BERLIN, supra note 185, at
200-01 ("[C]onfounding liberty with her sisters, equality and fraternity, leads to similarly illib-
eral conclusions.").
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pression and human dignity (or equality) may be construed as legiti-
mizing the limitation of speech. This confusion may be avoided by
keeping human dignity and free speech doctrinally separated.
The choice to separate dignity and speech does not require priori-
tization of one over the other. Rather, it merely recognizes dig-
nity's irrelevance as a free speech justification and properly places
dignity as an external constraint on free speech rather than an inter-
nal justification.
The current free speech discourse in the United States reflects the
traditional language of the First Amendment. It lacks representation
of more contemporary concerns which are reflected in the human
dignity discourse prevailing in other Western countries. °3 Using hu-
man dignity as a free speech justification is equivalent to introducing
new vocabulary into free speech theory. Such introduction may even
affect some of our most basic assumptions regarding free speech.°4
Mayo Moran's observation that the choice of certain terminology
influences outcomes should not be taken lightly, since such influence
may be far-reaching. 05 Acknowledging the rhetoric of human dignity
in freedom of expression contexts may prove to be harmful; the ma-
nipulable basis of human dignity, as well as its ambiguity, make this
especially true. It was the existing legal discourse and ruling para-
digms that preserved the stability of First Amendment doctrine
against the newly discovered insights regarding the effects of speech.
The existing doctrines blocked any significant effect of the new un-
derstandings, since the phenomenon did not quite fit the old catego-
206ries.
There is merit in claiming that a more transparent discourse rec-
ognizing the complexity of the conflict between human dignity and
free speech is valuable. And indeed, in some respects, attempting to
202 Cf Schauer, Speaking of Dignity, supra note 85, at 190-91 (arguing that in certain circum-
stances, "freedom of speech is different in dramatic ways from most other individual rights, and
thus the idea of dignity, which is highly relevant to thinking about many other rights, may be
much less relevant in thinking about freedom of speech").
203 Canada is a good example of a country that reflects such a discourse. See generally Moran,
supra note 191 (offering a thorough discussion of contemporary concerns in Canadian free
speech discourse).
See id. at 1426-27 ("So each of us must struggle to revivify our language, to adapt it to the
changing nuances of our communal life. In so doing, we not only come to better understand
our world, we also help to remake it.").205 See id. at 1435 ("The choice of context is significant in hate speech cases as well, for once
the issue is situated in a particular way, certain understandings appear far more plausible than
others. Certain facts immediately become relevant and thus susceptible to being found, while
others appear irrelevant, and thus are more easily lost.").
206 Cf GREENAWALT, FIGHTING WORDS, supra note 25, at 151 ("Perhaps one reason why the
Canadian Supreme Court has been so much more receptive to recent theories of this sort is
because it is unrestrained by the baggage of much prior adjudication under the Charter that is
committed to more traditional theories.").
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reconcile human dignity concerns with free speech concerns can
bring greater transparency, which is lacking from the existing U.S.
free speech discourse. °v In this sense, introducing human dignity
into free speech vocabulary may seem desirable regardless of its pos-
sible effects, even among supporters of the outcomes the current le-
gal regime and theory produces. 08
Nonetheless, we should be very suspicious of introducing new vo-
cabulary that might sweep free speech further away than initially in-
tended. After all, the "rhetorical choices" we make directly affect the
perception of the intricate interrelationship between human dignity
and freedom of expression. 09 Even if we were to recognize that there
should be an argument from dignity, and that the insights it brings to
the free speech arena are valuable, there is still a major caveat. As
Robert Post aptly noted, "[t] he challenge is thus how to preserve the
analytic force of the new scholarship without sacrificing the values
and concerns of more traditional accounts.
2 10
CONCLUSION
The nature of human dignity suggests that once human dignity
considerations are balanced vis-a-vis freedom of expression concerns,
it almost automatically leads to speech-restrictive results. Therefore,
the introduction of human dignity into freedom of expression theory
and rulings is detrimental to free speech, even without an absolutist
approach to human dignity. European constitutionalism and prac-
tice suggest that the Europeans are not up to the challenge, whereas
current American law is probably immune from human dignity's ef-
fects.
Labels matter. If freedom of expression is articulated in human
dignity terms, it will not be long before someone who has neglected
to fully understand the delicate nature of this connection would mis-
takenly interpret it in a very different way than Dworkin and
Greenawalt understand it. Furthermore, the minimalist account of
human dignity does not reflect many Western legal systems' under-
standings of rights and human dignity. In these cases human dignity
sends mixed signals as to the protection or limitation of speech.
Therefore, the possible harm of juxtaposing freedom of expression
207 See Schaeur, Freedom of Expression Adjudication, supra note 4, at 52-53 (presenting claims
that the non-American constitutional discourse of balancing, which also applies to free speech,
is more honest and transparent than the American discourse under the First Amendment).
208 Moran, supra note 191, at 1474-75 ("Even if one thinks that there are reasons to support
the official narrative's result, it is still inadequate for several reasons.").
See id. at 1498.
210 Robert C. Post, Censorship and Silencing, in CENSORSHIP AND SILENCING, supra note 44, at 4.
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with dignity and equality may well exceed the benefits of distinguish-
ing the argument from dignity from the argument from autonomy.
Autonomy is not affiliated with the same values as dignity and is
perceived in a more libertarian way than dignity or equality both in
Europe and the United States. Keeping an emphasis on autonomy
(or liberty) does not carry the same risks or at least significantly de-
creases the chances for possible term confusion and its undesirable
211consequences.
Autonomy is mainly (and intuitively) affiliated with libertarian
values and is therefore more compatible with the American paradigm
of free speech. As opposed to autonomy, prevalent perceptions of
human dignity, especially outside the United States, are communi-
212tarian. Although autonomy may be interpreted as accommodating
communitarian concerns and human dignity may be interpreted as
214accommodating libertarian concerns, both instances are peripheral
interpretations. The mainstream understandings of both terms lean
on different heritages. 15 When it comes to free speech justifications,
it is more appropriate to lean on classic liberal perceptions than
communitarian perceptions. Therefore, although autonomy is not
the silver bullet to the problems human dignity presents, it is still
preferable, because the human-dignity-based regime is more prone to
suppressing speech.
The argument from dignity, in its narrow sense, is not sufficiently
distinguishable from the argument from autonomy. The latter actu-
ally captures and conceptualizes the minimalist view of the argument
from dignity quite adequately and does not carry similar potential
misunderstandings as does the former. This "slippery slope" argu-
ment may seem unsubstantiated to the American reader because, in
the American context, human dignity (and equality) carry different
meanings than in most other Western democracies. Yet, as demon-
strated above, this is a genuine concern in other legal settings. When
Greenawalt and Dworkin articulated their view as to the argument
from dignity, they did so from an American perspective and may have
21 Compare Dworkin, Liberty and Pornography, supra note 106, (giving an example of a speech-
protective use of "dignity"), with Michelman, supra note 133, at 307 (giving an example of a
speech-restrictive use of "autonomy").
212 Cf POST, supra note 12, at 23-116 (affiliating human dignity with community); Brugger,
supra note 33, at 72-74 (describing the importance of protecting community values in judging
freedom of expression).
23 See Brison, supra note 22, at 336-38 (discussing the relationship between autonomy and
community); Michelman, supra note 133, at 303-04; Rosenfeld, supra note 170, at 1535, 1562
(noting that if autonomy is taken as requiring dignity and reciprocity, it may lead to speech re-
striction).
214 See discussion on Dworkin and Greenawalt supra Part III.A.1.
215 See discussion supra Part I (regarding the communitarian sources of human dignity and
libertarian sources of American fights discourse).
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overlooked the non-American approach that sheds a different light
on their arguments.
The multiplicity of theoretical writings on free speech lead to con-
stant discoveries of new free speech 'Justifications." Freedom of
speech supports many acts and ideologies by nature. Therefore, if
one wants, many rationales can be articulated in support of free
speech. But we have to ask ourselves whether the automatic espousal
of such rationales is always beneficial and what may be at stake. In
the case of dignity, as shown above, the disadvantages clearly surpass
the benefits. Therefore a skeptical approach towards the argument
from dignity is warranted.
Free speech justifications must be aimed at protecting speech-
not restricting it. Recognition of human dignity among these justifi-
cations, with all its above-mentioned potential interpretations that are
speech-restricting, is simply a bad idea. On one hand, speech-
protecting features of the argument from dignity, namely the mini-
malist account, are not sufficiently discernable from existing justifica-
tions. On the other hand, the more expansive argument from dignity
is not a justification for protecting free speech since it is also a poten-
tial justification for the limitation of speech. Moreover, it is doubtful
how exactly these arguments are free speech justifications as opposed
to general principles for the protection of all rights. Therefore, free
speech protection and theory have very little to gain from affiliation
with human dignity, and discourse that aligns the two might prove a
"Trojan Horse" with dignity as "the enemy from within."
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